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ABSTRACT
This study investigates breaches in the psychological employment contract during 
mergers and acquisitions. An employee’s contract is incomplete in regards to mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). In its place, psychological contracts are formed. Common 
psychological contracts breached in the M&A process include raises, bonuses, 
promotions, job responsibilities, job security, and career development. Employees who 
have experienced an M&A were surveyed to test the severity o f various psychological 
contract breaches and their effect on employee performance, organizational citizenship 
behavior, job satisfaction, organizational deviance, and turnover using t-tests, Structural 
Equation Modeling, and ANOVA. The mediating effect o f feelings of violation was also 
tested. Because psychological contract breaches may be unavoidable, the mitigating 
effect o f justice was tested, too.
APPROVAL FOR SCHOLARLY DISSEMINATION
The author grants to the Prescott Memorial Library o f Louisiana Tech University 
the right to reproduce, by appropriate methods, upon request, any or all portions o f this 
Dissertation. It was understood that “proper request” consists o f the agreement, on the 
part o f the requesting party, that said reproduction was for his personal use and that 
subsequent reproduction will not occur without written approval o f the author of this 
Dissertation. Further, any portions o f the Dissertation used in books, papers, and other 
works must be appropriately referenced to this Dissertation.
Finally, the author o f this Dissertation reserves the right to publish freely, in the 
literature, at any time, any or all portions o f this Dissertation.
Author IWUAfvi
Date n l - l S ___________








CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................7
Incomplete Contracts..............................................................................................................7
Gietzmann (1996).............................................................................................................8
Falk, Gachter, & Kovacs (1999)...................................................................................10
Fallan (2000)................................................................................................................... 12
Christ, Sedatole, & Towry (2012)............................................................................... 14






Morrison and Robinson (1997).................................................................................... 24




Cheng, Schulz, Luckett, and Booth (2003).................................................................27
Classe (2004)................................................................................................................. 29
Hayes and Schaefer (2005)...........................................................................................30
Duff and Monk (2006).................................................................................................. 33
Parker, Nouri, and Hayes (2011).................................................................................35





Tumley and Feldman (1998)....................................................................................... 44
Hubbard & Purcell (2001)............................................................................................46
Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson (2002)..............................................................................48
Cortvriend (2004)..........................................................................................................49
Searle and Ball (2004).................................................................................................. 51
Bligh and Carsten (2005)..............................................................................................53
Bellou (2007)................................................................................................................. 55































Hypothesis 1 Results...................................................................................................... 88
Hypothesis 2 Results......................................................................................................90







Structural Equations M odel................................................................................................ 99
Hypothesis 3 Results.................................................................................................... 100
Hypothesis 4 Results.................................................................................................... 102
Hypothesis 5 Results.................................................................................................... 105
Hypothesis 6 Results.................................................................................................... 109
ANOVA............................................................................................................................... 110
Hypothesis 7 Results.................................................................................................... 112
Supplemental A nalysis................................................................................................113
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION.................................................................................................115
Summary o f Findings..........................................................................................................115
Implications of the Findings..............................................................................................119
Limitations o f the Research...............................................................................................123
Contributions o f the Research........................................................................................... 124
Suggestions for Future Research......................................................................................125
REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................127
APPENDIX A BASIC STATISTICS.....................................................................................137
APPENDIX B SCALES............................................................................................................ 19
APPENDIX C MEASUREMENT SCALE ITEM CORRELATIONS............................. 144
APPENDIX D HUMAN USE APPROVAL LETTER....................................................... 147
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Comparison o f  Old and New Psychological Contracts................................ 41
Table 2 Demographic Information................................................................................71
Table 3 Demographic Information: Correlation Table.............................................. 83
Table 4 Control Variables: Correlations with Psychological Contract
Breaches............................................................................................................. 84
Table 5 Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control
Variables and Feelings o f  Violation...............................................................85
Table 6 Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control
Variables and Employee Performance.......................................................... 85
Table 7 Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control
Variables and Organizational Citizenship Behavior....................................85
Table 8 Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control
Variables and Job Satisfaction....................................................................... 86
Table 9 Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control
Variables and Organizational Deviance....................................................... 86
Table 10 Number o f  Participants Who Experienced Psychological Contract
Breaches............................................................................................................. 89
Table 11 Number o f  Participants Who Experienced Psychological Contract
Breaches............................................................................................................. 89
Table 12 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices: Root Mean Square
Error o f  Approximation & Comparative Fit Index.......................................93
Table 13 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Convergent Validity: Average
Variance Extracted ...........................................................................................94
Table 14 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Convergent Validity: Construct
Reliability...........................................................................................................95
Table 15 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Discriminant Validity: Average
Variance Extracted & Squared Interconstruct Correlation........................96
Table 16 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Nomological Validity: Correlations
by Psychological Contract Breach .................................................................98
Table 17 SEM  Fit Indices: Root Mean Square Error o f  Approximation &
Comparative Fit Index ....................................................................................100
Table 18 Descriptive Statistics fo r  Psychological Contract Breaches and
Feelings o f  Violation.......................................................................................101
Table 19 Psychological Contract Breach to Feelings o f  Violation: Expected
Sign and Standardized Regression Weight.................................................. 101
Table 20 Feelings o f  Violation to Employee Performance: Expected Sign and
Standardized Regression W eight.................................................................. 102
Table 21 Feelings o f  Violation to Organizational Citizenship Behaviors:
Expected Sign and Standardized Regression W eight.................................103
Table 22 Feelings o f  Violation to Job Satisfaction: Expected Sign and
Standardized Regression Weight.................................................................. 104
Table 23 Feelings o f  Violation to Organizational Deviance: Expected Sign
and Standardized Regression Weight...........................................................105
Table 24 Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract
Breach & Employee Performance Relationship: Significance o f  
Standardized Indirect Effect, Standardized Regression Weight and 
Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship..............................................106
Table 25 Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract 
Breach & Organizational Citizenship Behavior Relationship:
Significance o f  Standardized Indirect Effect, Standardized
Regression Weight and Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship ...A 06
Table 26 Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract
Breach & Job Satisfaction Relationship: Significance o f  Standardized 
Indirect Effect, Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f  
Residual Direct Relationship.........................................................................107
Table 27 Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract
Breach & Organizational Deviance Relationship: Significance o f  
Standardized Indirect Effect, Standardized Regression Weight and 
Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship..............................................108
xii
Table 28 Moderation Results: Difference in Unstandardized Regression
Weights o f  Psychological Contract Breach to Feelings o f  Violation 
by Low & High Justice...................................................................................110
Table 29 ANO VA Results: Means by Employment Group...........................................112
Table 30 Mean Scores on Organizational Citizenship Behavior and Job
Satisfaction Scales by Employment Group S tatus ...................................... 114
Table 31 Hypothesis Results Summary.......................................................................... 117
Table 33 Summary o f  Standardized Regression Weights by Psychological
Contract Breach...............................................................................................120
Table 34 Size Effects: Differences in Standardized Regression Weights within
Each Psychological Contract Breach Model...............................................122
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Theorized M odel................................................................................................ 79
Figure 2 Theorized Model with Control Variables.......................................................83
Figure 3 SEM  Model fo r  a Psychological Contract Breach o f  Raises..................... 121
Figure 4 SEM  Model fo r  a Psychological Contract Breach ofJob
Responsibilities...............................................................................................122
ACKNOW LEDGMENTS
I want to thank Dr. William Stammerjohan and Dr. Rebecca Bennett for being my 
co-chairs, and would like to thank Dr. Andrea Drake for serving as a member o f my 
dissertation committee. I will always be grateful to them for helping me achieve my 
goal. I would also like to thank my parents for their endless support throughout this 





Merger and acquisition decisions are made using accounting information, 
including financial results and projections. Radcliffe, Campbell, and Fogarty state “all 
acquisitions are based on expectations of future increased earnings per share” (2001, 
427). However, 30% to 50% of mergers and acquisitions decrease shareholder value, and 
60% to 80% of mergers and acquisitions do not add any shareholder value (Boyle, 
Carpenter, & Mahoney, 2012). This implies that companies are making merger and 
acquisition decisions on flawed financial projections.
One way in which these financial projections may be flawed is that unexpected 
costs are incurred during mergers and acquisitions. Employees are greatly affected by 
mergers and acquisitions, and unfortunately, employees’ expectations are often unmet 
throughout the merger and acquisition process. Employees’ reactions to these unmet 
expectations can create unanticipated costs for companies, which were not included in the 
initial financial projections. As stated by Mac Rory, a company’s “competitive advantage 
really is in people” (1999). A company’s employees are an important factor in the 
ultimate success or failure o f a merger or acquisition.
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This research seeks to answer: (1) why many companies fail to realize the full 
extent of anticipated benefits from a merger or acquisition, (2) during mergers and 
acquisitions, do employees perceive the organization has failed to deliver promised 
obligations, and (3) in the process of a merger or acquisition, are employees’ feelings and 
behaviors affected in a way that may ultimately reduce the expected benefits?
The literature stream on incomplete contracting demonstrates the prevalence of 
incomplete contracts; virtually every contract is incomplete in some way. This includes 
contracts between employers and employees (Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood, 2012; 
Falk, Gachter, & Kovacs, 1999). When an employment contract in incomplete, it leaves 
room for psychological contracts to be formed by employees.
A psychological contract is a belief in a promise by an employee, an anticipatory 
contribution made by the employee, and a perceived future obligation on the part of the 
organization to provide benefits to the employee (Rousseau, 1989). Smith (1993), Martin 
(1995), Schofield (1996), Mac Rory (1999), Bruce (2001), and Classe (2004) all urge 
practitioners to pay attention to employees’ psychological contracts. Bruce (2001) and 
Classe (2004) specifically remark on the importance o f psychological contracts during 
mergers and acquisitions because psychological contracts are frequently breached during 
the merger and acquisition process. This dissertation studies the following psychological 
contract breaches in a merger and acquisition setting: pay raises, bonuses, promotions, 
job responsibilities, job security, and career development.
In response to breaches in psychological contracts, employees may experience 
feelings o f violation, which are “affective and emotional experience[s] o f disappointment, 
frustration, anger, and resentment that may emanate from an employee’s interpretation of
a contract breach and its accompanying circumstances” (Morrison and Robinson 1997). 
It is hypothesized that the psychological contract breaches o f pay raises, bonuses, 
promotions, job responsibilities, job security, and career development lead to higher 
feelings o f violation. Organizational justice affects the way employees feel during 
mergers and acquisitions, and it is posited that organizational justice mitigates the 
relationship between psychological contracts and feelings o f violation.
This study examines the effects o f mergers and acquisitions on employee 
performance, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), job satisfaction, and 
organizational deviance. Prior literature has shown that negative outcomes are associated 
with changes in the psychological contracts from major organizational changes, such as 
mergers and acquisitions (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Cortvriend, 2004; Freese, Schalk, & 
Croon, 2011; Hubbard & Purcell, 2001; Searle & Ball, 2004; Shield, Thorpe, & Nelson, 
2002; Tumley & Feldman, 1998). It is hypothesized that feelings o f violation decrease 
employee performance, OCB, and job satisfaction and increase organizational deviance. 
It is also hypothesized that feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between 
psychological contract breaches and employee performance, OCB, job satisfaction, and 
organizational deviance.
In this dissertation, an online crowd-sourcing tool, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
was used to survey people who experienced a merger or acquisition in the United Stated. 
Previous studies used samples from one company or a select few companies that 
experienced a major organizational change. An online survey allows for the current 
study to be based on a wide range of companies and to also include employees who have 
left the organization in the sample.
Established scales were used to measure the following constructs: psychological 
contracts and feelings o f violation (Robinson & Morrison, 2000), employee performance 
(Williams and Anderson 1991), organizational citizenship behavior (Lee & Allen, 2002), 
job satisfaction (Russell et al., 2004), organizational deviance (Bennett & Robinson,
2000), and organizational justice (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). Three attention check 
questions were also included in the survey. These questions requested the respondents to 
select a particular answer in order to test how closely they are reading and answering the 
survey. Mechanical Turk “Workers” who correctly answered the attention check 
questions and completed the survey were paid $2.00 each. Five hundred observations 
were collected, and 493 were usable in the final sample.
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the hypotheses. This 
method was selected since the constructs used in this study are all latent constructs. 
Model fit and validity were assessed, further supporting the use of SEM. Multiple group 
analysis was used to test the moderator organizational justice. The sample was split into 
thirds based on the average score on the organizational justice scale. The top third was 
used as the ‘high justice’ group, while the lowest third was used was the ‘low justice’ 
group.
The results from structural equation modeling reveals that all six o f the 
psychological contract breaches (raises, bonuses, promotions, job responsibilities, job 
security, and career development) did in fact lead to higher feelings o f violation. The 
results from the multiple group analysis show that higher organizational justice 
significantly reduces this relationship between psychological contract breaches of raises, 
promotions, job security, and career development and feelings o f violation. However,
justice did not significantly mitigate the relationship between the breaches o f bonuses and 
job responsibilities and feelings o f violation.
The results also show the feelings of violation associated with bonuses, job 
responsibilities, job security, and career development lead to significantly decreased 
employee performance. Similarly, feelings o f violation associated with all psychological 
contract breaches, with the exception o f bonuses, significantly lowers organizational 
citizenship behavior among employees. Furthermore, employees’ job satisfaction is 
significantly reduced by feelings o f violation from all types of psychological contract 
breaches. Feelings o f violation also lead to a significant increase in organizational 
deviance. These outcomes (decreased performance, OCB, satisfaction and increased 
deviance) are undesirable for companies, but especially those going through a merger or 
acquisition.
In addition to testing the direct relationship between psychological contract 
breaches and feelings o f violation and between feelings o f violation and performance, 
OCB, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance, feelings of violation were tested a 
mediator. It was hypothesized that feelings o f violation has a mediating role in the direct 
relationship between the psychological contract breaches and the outcomes o f 
performance, OCB, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance. The results suggest 
that feelings o f violation have more of a mediating role with the psychological contracts 
that are relational in nature, which “entails broad, open-ended, and long-term obligations” 
(Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229).
This dissertation contributes to several streams of literature. First, this study 
extends the literature on incomplete employment contracts by investigating their effect on
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employee misconduct, performance, turnover, organizational citizenship behaviors, and 
job satisfaction during the merger and acquisition process. This study also contributes to 
the psychological contract literature. A variety o f psychological contracts have been 
studied in the accounting literature, including auditors’ job expectations (Herrbach,
2001), commitment to a rate of return (Cheng, Schulz, Luckett, & Booth, 2003), bonuses 
(Hayes & Schaefer, 2005), newly hired faculty’s job expectations (Duff & Monk, 2006), 
promotions (Parker, Nouri, & Hayes, 2011), and job responsibilities and job security 
(Williams and Adams 2013). This study furthers the work of Hayes and Schaefer (2005) 
on bonuses, Parker, Nouri, and Hayes (2011) on promotions, and Williams and Adams 
(2013) on job security, by studying these psychological contracts in a merger and 
acquisition setting. This study also empirically tests the conjectures made by Bruce 
(2001) and Classe (2004) that psychological contracts are important during mergers and 
acquisitions. By including justice as a moderator, this study continues the research 
stream on justice during mergers and acquisitions (Hubbard & Purcell, 2001; Searle & 
Ball, 2004; Tumley & Feldman, 1998). Additionally, employee performance, 
organizational deviance, and organizational citizenship behaviors are examined, which 





“The concept o f the contract is one o f the most powerful and pervasive ideas 
through which economic and political theorists have tried to understand our society” 
(Mackintosh 1993, 135). According to Coase (1937), a contract should only contain the 
limits o f one party, but forecasting a party’s responsibilities over a longer contract period 
is difficult. A contract is incomplete if “it contains gaps or missing provisions; ...the 
contract will specify some actions the party must take but not others; it will mention what 
should happen in some states of the world but not in others” (Hart 1988, 123). Contracts 
are incomplete when the parties are unsure o f what will happen in the future or if  it is too 
costly to identify future events (Hart and Moore, 1999).
Coase (1937) gives two fundamentals of the relationship between an employer 
and an employee. The first is that the employee must be rendering services to the 
employer or to others on behalf of the employer. Another main aspect o f the employer- 
employee relationship is that the employer has the right to control how and when an 
employee does his or her work. Yet, the majority of employment contracts are ‘at will’ 
and may be let go at any time (Hart 1988). This shows that parts o f the employment 
contract are frequently ambiguous and incomplete.
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Common examples of incomplete contracts are those between employers and 
employees (Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012; Christ 
Emett, Summers, and Wood 2012), buyers and suppliers (Baiman and Rajan 2002a; 
Baiman and Rajan 2002b), departments (Baldenius, Reichelstein, and Sahay 1999; 
Baldenius 2000), firms (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2006), and contracts for make or 
buy decisions (Gietzmann 1996; Fallan 2000).
Gietzmann (1996)
Gietzmann (1996) discusses the traditional make or buy decision faced by motor 
vehicle assemblers. However, the decision is not always a dichotomous choice. As the 
importance o f flexibility increases, so does non-contracted behavior (Macaulay, 1963). 
Gietzmann (1996) examines the role o f accounting governance systems based on trust 
and commitment in these non-contracted interactions, such as relationships with 
subcontractors.
The incomplete contracting theory assumes that (1) not all future possibilities can 
be (affordably) foreseen and contracted upon and (2) that both parties may behave 
opportunistically. If a subcontractor has invested in any assets that would not be valuable 
outside o f the current relationship, the assembler has an opportunity to renegotiate 
previously agreed upon exchange terms to be in their favor, knowing that the 
subcontractor is stuck. This could lead to a hold-up problem because the subcontractor 
would be wary to invest again in assets that are unique to the current relationship. In 
order to maintain a good reputation among subcontractors, assemblers should not change 
subcontractors very often. With this knowledge, the current subcontractor has the chance 
to be opportunistic and the assembler faces an inverted hold-up problem. Social norms,
9
customs, and reputations become vital to making these non-contracted relationships 
successful (Gietzmann, 1996).
Gietzmann's (1996) main argument is that the traditional make or buy decision 
suffers from unnecessary restrictions. In general, the price o f a standard, ‘off the shelf 
unit is used in the decision-making process. This provides little incentive for 
subcontractors to work closely with assemblers to develop customized units. As an 
example of a different approach, Gietzmann (1996) takes a closer look at Japanese 
assemblers, who do form close relationships with their subcontractors. Asanuma (1985, 
1989) theorizes that Japanese assemblers are encouraged to have close relationships with 
subcontractors, whereas the incomplete contracting theory assumes subcontractors’ 
investments in relationship-specific assets is the basis o f the relationship. Asanuma 
(1989) also discusses a tournament procedure, where subcontractors are ranked on their 
involvement in the design o f the subcomponents (off the shelf, design approved, or 
design supplied).
The sample consists o f a Japanese assembler’s first tier subcontractors at a 
European site. The subcontractors were given a survey to complete to see how the 
Europeans react to the Japanese practices. The sample size was small. 27 subcontractors 
received the survey and the response rate was 67%, resulting in a final sample o f 18 
participants. The sample size was small because the assembler recently moved the site to 
Europe and was still increasing in size and also because having a small number o f first 
tier subcontractors is a feature unique to Japanese supply management.
It was hypothesized and found that relationships are long-term, at least two years. 
The subjects indicated that the tournament procedures can be used as a motivational
10
technique, and that the subcontractors desire a promotion. The contracts are in an 
obligational form, with a high level o f information sharing. The subcontractors trusted 
the assembler to issue further orders, and the subcontractors made relational specific 
investments.
Falk, Gdchter, & Kovacs (1999)
Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs (1999) note that most employment contracts are 
incomplete, leaving many duties unspecified for the employer and the employee. In 
general, employment contracts have a fixed salary, but performance incentives and work 
effort are ambiguous. Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs (1999) discuss three features of 
employment contracts. The first feature is reciprocity, defined as “the non-strategic 
conditional willingness to reward kind acts (positive reciprocity) and to punish unkind 
ones (negative reciprocity) even if this is costly for the reciprocating subject” (Falk, 
Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 254). Reciprocity is an intrinsic motivation for people who 
display this willingness without extrinsic incentives. Intrinsic motivations are “followed 
for their own sake” and extrinsic incentives are “provided only by the environment and 
the nature of interaction” (Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 256). Another feature of 
employment contracts is that they are long-term, involving repeated interactions. 
Reciprocity is generally valued by employers and may be rewarded with a higher salary. 
A higher salary serves as an extrinsic incentive for people to behave reciprocally in 
repeated interactions, even if they are not intrinsically motived by reciprocity. Social 
interactions are the last feature o f employment relations. These social interactions may 
result in social approval or disapproval, which is another extrinsic incentive.
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A laboratory experiment was chosen in order to manipulate intrinsic motivations 
and extrinsic incentives. The sample consists o f 126 students from a university in 
Hungary, who were from different fields, and did not know each other. This resulted in 
63 randomly matched pairs of “workers” and “firms”. The game used was the gift- 
exchange game. The firm offers the worker a wage and the worker accepts or rejects it. 
A rejection results in zero profit for the firm and an unemployment benefit o f 20 for the 
worker. If the worker accepts the offered wage, then the worker picks an effort level. A 
higher effort level results in a higher cost. This experiment represents an incomplete 
contract setting since the level of effort is chosen by the worker, not specified by the firm.
Four treatments are utilized in this experiment. The “Stranger” treatment is the 
control treatment, where the effects of reciprocity are isolated. Participants play a series 
o f ten anonymous, one-shot games. The subjects in the other three treatments played 
repeated games (ten rounds) and kept the same opponent for the duration o f the 
experiment. The “Partner” treatment was used to control for the effects of repeated 
interactions. In the “Approval: Face-to-Face” treatment, participants were introduced to 
their opponent before the game, but they did not communicate verbally or with written 
comments. The “Approval: Social Pressure” group were allowed only nonverbal 
communication during the game. This group was instructed that there would be a 
discussion about the experiment after the session. Both the “Approval: Face-to-Face” 
and “Approval: Social Pressure” groups were used to determine the effects of social 
exchange.
The Repeated Interaction Hypothesis, which involves a comparison o f the 
“Stranger” and “Partner” treatment groups, predicts that (i) “for a given wage, the
12
average effort level is at least as high as in the Stranger-treatment” and (ii) “average wage 
and effort levels approach the levels of the Stranger-treatment by the last period” (Falk, 
Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 265). The Approval Hypothesis requires a comparison 
between the Partner-treatment and the Approval-treatments. It posits that (i) “for a given 
wage, effort levels are at least as high as the Partner-treatment” and (ii) “in the Social 
Pressure treatment, for a given wage, effort levels are at least as high as in the Face-to- 
Face treatment” (Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, 266). The findings reveal that 
reciprocal behavior was similar across treatments, and that repeated interactions did 
increase effort levels, while social approval did not. The results demonstrate the 
importance of the intrinsic motivation o f reciprocity, and that the extrinsic incentives of 
repeated interactions and social approval were o f lesser importance in this experiment.
Fallan (2000)
Fallan (2000) studies the make-or-buy decision o f accounting services, whether to 
use an external accounting firm or have an internal accounting department. The costs of 
each option, production costs for the make decision and governance costs for the buy 
decision, are compared. To save on contracting expenses, only the general guidelines of 
relationships between the buyer and the seller are established, resulting in an incomplete 
contract.
A transaction cost economics approach can be used to study production and 
governance costs. There are three dimensions o f transaction cost economics (TCE): 
uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity (Williamson 1981). Uncertainty is defined 
as “the inability o f decision makers to specify a complete decision tree” (Fallan 2000, 
57). Fallan's (2000) main argument is that trust between the buyer and supplier is a way
13
to mitigate any fears of uncertainty that may form in an incomplete contracting setting. 
Fallan (2000) replaces the dimension o f uncertainty with trust. Frequency refers to how 
often the transaction occurs, and asset specificity is “the degree to which transaction- 
specific investments in physical and/or in human assets are involved” (Fallan 2000, 60).
When trust is low, it is hypothesized that the make decision will be a better 
choice. As trust increases, so will the likelihood of a buy decision. It is also 
hypothesized that the less (more) frequent the transactions, the less (more) likely a buy 
(make) decision will be made. The physical assets necessary for accounting services, 
such as computers and software, are not as specific o f investments as the human 
investment. If a firm’s accounting system is complex, the human investment of 
specialized knowledge is more specific to the current relationship. Therefore, it is 
predicted that higher asset specificity increases the chance o f a make decision.
The unit o f analysis used to examine the make-or-buy decision is the transaction 
itself (Williamson 1985). This study also includes the relation as a unit o f analysis. The 
transaction is the keeping of a firm’s accounts and the relation is the relationship between 
the buyer and the seller. Norwegian firms were used for the sample, and data was 
collected from tax forms. Surveys were mailed to the owner or the treasurer o f the firm. 
The response rate was 46%, and the final sample size was 137 responses.
If the firm kept their accounts, the response was coded as 0, and if an external 
accounting firm was used, the response was coded as 1. To measure perceived trust, 
respondents were asked “To what extent does the firm trust the quality o f accounting 
services which the firm is buying or may buy from an external accountancy firm”. 
Frequency was measured by the sales o f the firm. Norwegian law offers seven complex
14
tax planning instruments, which are not used by many firms. The use o f these 
instruments was used to measure asset specificity. Individual instruments were coded as 
zero if they were not used and one if they were. Logistic regression was utilized in this 
study. The classification accuracy rate was 78.6%, with most of the classification power 
coming from trust and frequency. The predicted positive relationships between trust and 
a buy decision was supported, as was the positive relationship between frequency and a 
make decision. No significance was found for the relationship between asset specificity 
and the make-or-buy decision.
Christ, Sedatole, & Towry (2012)
A complete contract “fully specifies the obligations o f the principal to provide 
monetary rewards to the agent for each potential performance outcome” (Christ, 
Sedatole, and Towry 2012, 1914). Since all obligations are identified, trust does not have 
a role between the principal and agent (Al-Najjar & Casadesus-Masanell, 2001). In 
actuality, most principal-agent contracts are incomplete (Luft, 1994). Trust has a more 
significant role when a contract is incomplete and there is discretion over monetary 
rewards.
The main research question asked by Christ, Sedatole, and Towry (2012) is 
whether the framing of the contract affects the level o f trust the agent has in the principal. 
A negatively framed penalty contract may send the message that the principal questions 
the agent’s integrity and competence, which leads the agent to trust the principal less 
(Das & Teng, 2001), while a positively framed bonus contract does not signal doubt in 
the agent’s honesty and abilities. Prior research has found that trust has a reciprocity 
effect. When one party perceives mistrust from another party, they are more likely to feel
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mistrust in response (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). If an agent mistrusts the principal, then 
he or she may question whether effort will be appropriately rewarded by the principal. 
The main hypothesis states that “in an incomplete contract setting, agent effort on tasks 
not governed by the incentive contract will be greater under a bonus contract as compared 
to a penalty contract” (Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012, 1919).
A computer-based experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis. Christ, 
Sedatole, and Towry (2012) use an incomplete contracting setting, where the payment for 
one task was performance-based and the payment for the second task was left up to the 
principal. The sample was 220 graduate and undergraduate students in accounting 
classes, and the subjects were randomly assigned the role o f principal or agent. A 2x2x1 
set up was used. The first variable, contract frame, was either a bonus or a penalty. The 
second variable, contract implementation, was the principal’s decision to use the 
incentive contract or not. This variable was measured, not manipulated, and only the 
conditions with use o f the incentive contract were analyzed. The plus one was a control 
group with a fixed wage.
The agent was asked to choose a portfolio o f investments for the principal. The 
agent’s effort is operationalized as the cost o f investment, as in prior literature (Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1993). The agent chose from two investments, shares in Whistle 
or Bell. Whistle shares were more expensive, but had a higher average expected return. 
The principal wants the higher return from the Whistle shares, while the agent prefers the 
Bell shares since they are paying for the investment. In the bonus contract condition, 
agents received a bonus if the total returns met or exceeded a return minimum. 
Participants in the penalty contract condition were penalized if the returns did not meet
16
the minimum. No bonuses or penalties were given in the fixed wage condition. The 
subjects were not informed of their returns until the end of the experiment. The agents 
selected an investment portfolio for the principal twice, once with a formal contract and 
once with a contract that with incomplete with regards to the payoff. In the second task, 
the agent made another investment. Only Horn shares were available for this additional 
investment. The return on the shares was known, and the agent chose to purchase zero to 
fifty shares. The number o f shares chosen was the measure o f costly agent effort. The 
principal was then made aware o f the number o f Horn shares the agent purchased and 
chose how much of the return to pay the agent.
The findings revealed that the main hypothesis was supported; agent effort was 
higher under a bonus contract than a penalty contract. It was also found that subjects felt 
more intrusion and less autonomy with a penalty contract, and perceived trust in the 
principal decreased when the agent’s integrity was questioned. Finally, it was found that 
trust was reciprocal, as expected.
Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood (2012)
The main objective of this study is to examine the effects o f two types o f formal 
controls on employee performance and motivation. Christ, Emett, Summer, and Wood 
(2012) use an incomplete contract setting, because that is similar to the real world 
(Williamson 1985; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997). The two types o f formal controls 
are preventive and detective. According to Romney and Steinbart (2009), preventive 
controls “deter problems before they arise, while detective controls “discover problems 
after they occur” (Christ et al. 2012, 432). Preventive controls constrain employees’ 
autonomy, since they restrict their actions, and give immediate feedback. Detective
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controls do not restrict the employees’ actions, and give immediate or delayed feedback 
(Christ, Sedatole, Towry, and Thomas 2008). The formal controls are expected to bring 
attention to the controlled task, and result in better employee performance. Research in 
motivation has found that employees have difficulty focusing on more than one goal at 
the same time (Lindenberg, 2001). With the use of formal controls that bring the 
employees’ attention to a certain task, it is expected that performance on other tasks tends 
to suffer.
It is hypothesized that employees will perform the best (worst) on the controlled 
(compensated) dimension of a task when a preventative control is in place, followed by a 
detective control with immediate feedback, then a detective control with delayed 
feedback, and finally when no controls are imposed. Christ et al. (2012) also hypothesize 
that preventative controls have a negative impact on intrinsic motivation more so than 
detective controls with immediate feedback, detective controls with delayed feedback, 
and when no controls are used.
The participants of the experiment consisted o f 131 graduate and undergraduate 
business students. The justification for using students as the sample in this experiment is 
that students do perform this kind o f task in the “real world” and age and experience are 
not expected to matter for this task. The participants were asked to complete a data entry 
task as quickly and as accurately as they could for the pretest. They were informed that 
their compensation was based on their data entry speed. The payoffs ranged from $5 to 
$15, and the average expected payoff was $10. All subjects completed the same pretest 
and no controls were used. Afterwards, they were given directions for the second task.
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A 1x4 experimental design was employed for this study. The four treatment 
groups were (1) a condition with no controls, (2) the preventative control condition, (3) 
the detective control with immediate feedback condition, and (4) the detective control 
with delayed feedback condition. The second task was the same as the pretest in the 
condition with no controls. In the preventative control condition, controls were placed on 
some characters so that if  participants if  incorrectly entered a character, the incorrect 
character would turn red, and they were unable to move on until they typed in the correct 
character. In the detective control with immediate feedback condition, incorrectly 
entered characters would turn red, and subjects were unable to go back and correctly 
enter the character. For the detective control with delayed feedback condition, 
incorrectly entered characters would turn red after all of the characters on that page were 
entered, and the participants were not able to make any corrections. Subjects were 
measured on data entry speed to proxy for performance on the compensated dimension of 
the task, and data entry accuracy was measured to proxy for performance on the 
controlled dimension. The controlled dimension simulates an incomplete contract 
condition, while the compensated dimension represents a complete contract setting.
Although descriptive statistics show the predicted order o f performance on the 
controlled dimension, the only significant difference is between the detective control 
conditions. Performance is significantly higher with detective controls and immediate 
feedback than detective controls with delayed feedback, suggesting that the timing of 
feedback has the most influence on performance. Descriptive statistics did not show the 
predicted order of performance on the compensated dimension, and none o f the 
differences were significant. The subjects in the preventative control condition had less
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intrinsic motivation than in the other conditions, as hypothesized. The preventative 
control condition differs from the others in that it constrains employees’ autonomy, 
indicating that restricting autonomy negatively affects intrinsic motivation.
Summary
Most contracts are incomplete to some degree. This is because it can be very 
costly to contract for all future events or it may even be impossible (Hart and Moore 
1999). Common examples o f incomplete contracts are between buyers and suppliers for 
make or buy decisions (Fallan, 2000; Gietzmann, 1996) and those between employers 
and employees (Christ, Emett, et al., 2012; Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; Falk et al., 
1999).
Factors that affect incomplete make-or-buy contracts are the accounting 
governance system (Gietzmann, 1996) and the costs (Fallan, 2000). It is important to 
consider the accounting governance system so that it is designed to allow for 
relationships based on trust and commitment to develop between subcontractors, for 
example. The costs associated with governance and the product costs should be given 
due consideration, such as trust, frequency of transactions, and asset specificity.
The employer-employee relationship is affected by performance incentives 
including reciprocity, repeated interactions, and social interactions (Falk et al., 1999). 
Also, the framing of the contract influences trust between the principal and agent (Christ, 
Sedatole, et al., 2012). Finally, formal controls impact motivation and employee 
performance (Christ, Emett, et al., 2012). Though not all parts of a job are contracted, 
employees still have expectations of what will happen.
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These studies show some of the effects o f incomplete contracts. The variety of 
the studies demonstrates the wide applicability o f incomplete contract situations. The 
current study extends the literature on incomplete employment contracts by examining 
the effects in a merger or acquisition setting.
Psychological Contracts
When an employee’s contract is incomplete, psychological contracts often 
emerge. A psychological contract involves an “individual's beliefs regarding the terms 
and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that focal person and another 
party” (Rousseau 1989, 123). The basic concept behind psychological contracts is 
explained by the Social Exchange Theory. The Social Exchange Theory encompasses a 
sequence o f interactions that creates obligations (Blau, 1964). The general rules for the 
social exchange are the reciprocity rule, which states that there will be some form o f 
repayment, and the negotiation rule, which allows for negotiation o f terms that will 
benefit both parties (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). A psychological contract is formed 
when an individual perceives that his or her efforts create an obligation o f reciprocity 
from the other party. Individuals will have a stronger perception o f an obligation if the 
promise is made before they make their contribution. It is this sequence that makes the 
promise contractual. The other party may or may not be aware that a promise has been 
perceived to have been made. In short, there must be a belief in a promise by the 
employee, an anticipatory contribution made by the employee, and a perceived future 
obligation on the part of the organization to provide benefits to the employee (Rousseau, 
1989).
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Psychological contracts fall on a continuum. The psychological contracts that are 
transactional in nature fall at one end o f the continuum, and the psychological contracts 
that are relational in nature fall at the other end. However, transactional and relational 
psychological contracts are not mutually exclusive. The absence o f a transactional 
contract does not necessarily indicate a relational contract. The contracts may be 
monetarily based and/or they may be based on socio-emotional elements. Transactional 
psychological contracts are “specific, short-term, and monetizable obligations entailing 
limited involvement of the parties” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229). In contrast, a 
psychological contract is considered relational when it “entails broad, open-ended, and 
long-term obligations” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229). The type o f psychological 
contract may affect the likelihood of an employee perceiving a contract exists or that one 
has been broken.
A perceived breach in psychological contract occurs when there is a perception 
that a promised obligation is not fulfilled in proportion to one’s contributions. There are 
two factors that may lead to a perceived breach in contract. The first is reneging, which 
is when the other party is aware that a psychological contract exists but does not follow 
through with the obligation. The other party may be unwilling or unable to follow 
through with the obligation. The second factor is incongruence, which is when the 
perceptions about a promise are different between the two parties. The second party may 
not even be aware that a promise was perceived. In fact, a real breach may or may not 
have actually occurred. As such, a perceived breach in contract is very subjective in 
nature. The accounting literature is somewhat limited in its applications o f psychological 
contracts, despite their frequency.
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Smith (1993)
Management accounting focuses on reducing costs and increasing efficiency and 
according to Smith “by training, a management accountant is concerned with cost 
reduction and efficiency”(1993, 48). Many times managers do not consider how their 
words and actions may be perceived by an individual. This may result in a 
misconception by the employee, and it is hard for managers to regain the trust that was 
lost. Managers need an information system and should be approachable and make time 
for employees so they can communicate individual circumstances. There are times when 
employees may be dealing with issues outside o f the workplace that impact their 
performance, and allowances may be appropriate and necessary. Although the employer 
expects effort from the employee, they may not understand the give and take necessary to 
elicit that effort. Smith’s purpose is to bring attention to the existence o f a psychological 
contract between the employer and the employee, where the employee puts forth effort 
with the expectation that the employer provides support in exchange (1993). He also 
conjectures that giving attention to the human element is beneficial for the organization 
in the long-run.
Martin (1995)
The economic environment of increased competition, downsizing, restructuring, 
and other organizational changes has threatened job security. This increases the 
importance o f the performance appraisal. Employees are concerned about fairness and 
the effect on their pay and promotion opportunities. Martin (1995) states the
psychological contract has become outdated and been lost. The psychological contract he 
is referring to is the unofficial understanding that if  employees work hard, they will
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receive pay raises and promotions and generally be taken care o f by the firm. Due to the 
rapidly changing environment, redundancy is more common. Though not tested in this 
article, Martin (1995) suggests a solution, that the new psychological contract should be 
an unofficial agreement that effort is put forth in exchange for long-term employability, 
either within the firm or with a different firm. He also advises that the employer can 
increase employability by providing training and experience, and that this is an updated 
way for companies to provide job security in exchange for the employees’ hard work.
Schofield (1996)
Employees used to give their loyalty and effort in exchange for the employer 
providing security and career development. This psychological contract has been broken 
due to all of the changes in the workplace. The Harris Research Centre for the Institute 
of Personnel and Development and Templeton College in Oxford identified common 
changes including the introduction of new technology, new working practices, 
restructuring, redundancies, and takeovers and mergers. Rather than expecting a life-long 
job, employees today should prepare for lifelong employability. Unfortunately, much of 
the training provided for employees is focused on the needs o f that organization. A 
report by the Institute o f Employment Studies suggested elements of new psychological 
contracts. Employers should seek strong identification to the business goals, flexibility to 
switch to new tasks, ability and willingness to retrain, and the ability to find another job 
should the need arise. Employees should seek career development, a choice in job roles 
and work/life balance, the ability to plan for financial security, information about job 
options, and real negotiation processes. This will help both parties meet their needs from 
the employment relationship.
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Morrison and Robinson (1997)
Morrison and Robinson (1997) define feelings o f violation as “an affective and 
emotional experience o f disappointment, frustration, anger, and resentment that may 
emanate from an employee’s interpretation of a contract breach and its accompanying 
circumstances.” The severity o f the violation depends on the perceived extent o f the 
psychological contract breach. The reason for the breach and the fairness with which an 
employee is treated also contribute to the development of feelings o f violation. The 
authors use theory to argue that employees are more likely to perceive a transactional 
psychological contract breach since reciprocity expectations are more direct and 
immediate than with relational psychological contracts. Additionally, the authors posit 
that, according to theory, when relational breaches are perceived, the feelings o f violation 
will be stronger. This is because a breach in a relational contract is in such contrast with 
the social contract (Morrison and Robinson 1997).
Mac Rory (1999)
Mac Rory states “In previous years our [Ireland’s] unemployment level was 
amongst the highest in Europe” (1999, 28). When unemployment was high, companies 
did not have to focus as much on retention. Now that the unemployment rate is lower, 
retention is much more important. The old psychological contract was an exchange of 
loyalty between the employer and employee. Today, the psychological contract is an 
exchange o f employee commitment for a challenging, interesting job and employability. 
If employees actually want to work, they are not only more committed, but more 
motivated, productive, and innovative. This benefits the employee and the organization. 
After all, the competitive advantage o f a business is in its people.
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Bruce (2001)
Many employees have experienced organizational changes such as 
reorganizations, mergers, demergers, and rationalizations and their psychological 
contracts have been broken. Not many organizations pay sufficient attention to 
psychological contracts, even though they are important. Bruce (2001) refers to 
transactional contracts as the rules and relational contracts as emotional attachment. The 
relational contract is considered more important because when it is breached, “then 
everything starts to unravel” (Bruce 2001, 40). Bruce (2001) explains that employees 
may react to a breach with absenteeism or acts o f sabotage towards the company, and 
employees will then renegotiate their psychological contract. He also predicts that these 
problems are worse if the company experiences a difficult merger, though none of these 
conjectures were tested.
Herrbach (2001)
Herrbach (2001) describes auditing as a double agency relationship. The first 
principal-agent relationship is between financial statement users (principals) and the audit 
firm (agent), and the second relationship is between the owners o f an audit firm 
(principals) and their auditor employees (agents). Herrbach (2001) examines the second 
principal-agent relationship by studying the effect of audit seniors’ behavior on audit 
quality. More specifically, he focuses on senior auditors’ quality reducing behaviors.
An audit quality reduction is defined as “poor execution of an audit procedure that 
reduces the level o f evidence gathered for the audit, so that the collected evidence is 
unreliable, false or inadequate quantitatively or qualitatively” (Herrbach 2001, 790). 
Audit quality reduction behaviors used in the study are (1) the reduction o f work below
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what would normally be considered reasonable, (2) superficial review of client 
documents, (3) acceptance o f weak client explanations, (4) failure to research an 
accounting principle, (5) failure to pursue a questionable item, and (6) false sign-off. 
Quality reducing behaviors that are indirectly linked to audit quality are also included. 
The following quality reducing behaviors pertain to audit seniors’ role attributes: (1) 
supervising a team member inadequately, (2) filling out staff performance appraisals too 
rapidly, and (3) putting the audit team under excessive pressure. Non-professional 
quality reducing behaviors are (1) Looking for another job in front o f the audit team, (2) 
gossiping about the firm, (3) casting doubt on the firm’s methods in the presence o f the 
audit team, and (4) casting doubt on the effectiveness of an audit.
The relationship between an audit firm and an auditor meets the definition o f a 
psychological contract. The auditors perform their jobs, and the audit firm compensates 
them in various ways. Herrbach (2001) studies the effect o f psychological contract 
breach on quality reducing behaviors. He uses the following elements o f the 
psychological contract: job security, a high salary, performance-based pay, interesting 
work, an international experience, career opportunities within the firm, career 
opportunities outside the firm, quality professional training, work autonomy, and an 
enjoyable human environment. Affective commitment is included as an independent 
variable in addition to the psychological contract. Based on prior literature, perception of 
the firm’s quality control and the frequency o f underreported time are independent, 
contextual variables analyzed in this study. The individual quality reducing behaviors are 
combined into three dependent variables by category (audit quality reduction, team 
mismanagement, and non-professional behaviors). A questionnaire was mailed to 395
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French audit seniors who work in one o f the Big Five international audit firms or two 
large French firms, with a response rate o f 43% (170). In order to increase the reliability 
o f self-reported responses, the design of the survey guaranteed anonymity o f the 
respondents. Herrbach (2001) also surveyed former audit seniors and those results are 
highly similar to those presented in the paper.
O f the ten elements of the psychological contract, work autonomy, professional 
training, and enjoyable human environment are significantly and negatively related to 
audit quality reduction behaviors. When the psychological contract elements o f work 
autonomy, professional training, and enjoyable human environment are not fulfilled, the 
audit quality may suffer through increased audit quality reducing behaviors. The results 
are similar for non-professional and team mismanagement behaviors, although interesting 
work is positively related to team mismanagement behaviors. The results show that 
affective commitment is negatively and significantly related to non-professional 
behaviors, but not audit quality reducing behaviors. Auditors who are less affectively 
committed do not exhibit more audit quality reducing behaviors than others, though they 
do engage in nonprofessional behaviors more so than auditors with higher affective 
commitment.
Cheng, Schulz, Luckett, and Booth (2003)
The escalation o f commitment phenomenon describes the situation where 
decision makers continue uneconomic projects, even if they have information about poor 
past performance or more profitable opportunities. De-escalation strategies attempt to 
reduce escalation of commitment, such as project hurdle rates. Project hurdle rates, or 
minimum rate o f return targets, serve as benchmarks that managers can use to determine
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if  a particular project is economically beneficial to their organization. The hurdle rate 
can be set by an organization and serve as a standardized assessment for projects. The 
hurdle rate can also be self-set by the manager making investment decisions. In this 
situation, the psychological contract is with one’s self. Cheng et al. (2003) describe the 
self-set hurdle as a psychological contract between the self-set hurdle rate and the 
manager; the manager expects that if  the hurdle rate is met, the project will be 
economically successful.
Cheng et al. (2003) hypothesize that the level o f escalation o f commitment will be 
lower for managers with organization-set hurdle rates (and self-set hurdle rates) than 
those without formal hurdle rates. They posit that the level o f escalation o f commitment 
will be lower for managers with self-set hurdle rates than for the managers with 
organization-set hurdle rates. A 1x3 research design is employed in a laboratory 
experiment. The three treatments are no hurdle rate, organization-set hurdle rate, and 
self-set hurdle rate. The dependent variable is the tendency to continue an uneconomic 
project. For the experiment, the subjects were asked to assume they were a project 
manager at a firm. The hurdle rates were considered non-binding in both the self-set and 
organization-set treatment groups. These two treatment groups were given a scenario in 
which the project’s return had fallen below the hurdle rate and a more profitable project 
was available. All subjects were required to decide whether to continue or terminate the 
current project.
This decision was used to measure the tendency to continue an uneconomic 
project on a 10-point scale. The initial commitment level was manipulated by informing 
the participants o f the following information. As a manager, they were responsible for
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the performance o f the project and their decision was announced in a newsletter. This 
was a key project for them, plus they showed their commitment to the project by 
promoting it to colleagues. Managers in the company were considered very talented if 
they managed their projects successfully, but their reputation would be harmed if they did 
not act as if  they were committed to the project. O f the 205 Australian undergraduate 
students who participated in the experiment, only 186 of them passed the manipulation 
check.
ANOVA was used to calculate the overall mean of the level of escalation for each 
treatment group. The results showed that although the level o f escalation o f commitment 
was lower for the organization-set hurdle rate treatment group than the no hurdle rate 
treatment group, the difference was not statistically significant. However, the escalation 
commitment level o f the self-set hurdle group treatment was significantly lower than the 
no hurdle group treatment. The psychological contract provided a commitment to the 
hurdle rate, not the project. As hypothesized, the level o f escalation o f commitment was 
lower for the self-set hurdle rate treatment group than the group with the organization-set 
hurdle rate. These results demonstrate the importance of the psychological contract 
formed with the self-set hurdle rate.
Classe (2004)
During mergers and acquisitions, the human aspect o f change is frequently 
overlooked. According to consultants, not paying attention to the human aspect in the 
early part of an organizational change is why mergers and acquisitions often do not meet 
shareholder expectations. The relationship between employer and employee is important 
as most employees have perceived a psychological contract with their employer. In a
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company, psychological contracts are likely to be mostly transactional or mostly 
relational. Organizational changes may be perceived as a breach o f the psychological 
contract, and employees may feel less committed to the post-change organization. This 
can be very harmful to a company’s bottom line. “When it comes to mergers and 
acquisitions, the nature o f the psychological contract -  and whether it is breached during 
the change -  can make the difference between success and failure” Valerie Garrow told 
the Chartered Institute o f Personnel Development’s...annual ‘Psychology at work’ 
conference in December 2004” (Classe 2004, 32).
Hayes and Schaefer (2005)
Hayes and Schaefer (2005) study a specific type o f psychological contract, the 
relational contract, analytically. To evaluate a manager’s performance, all available 
information should be used. Therefore, a manager’s bonus may be based on information 
that is not available to all market participants. Hayes and Schaefer (2005) use the term 
market participants to refer to non-insider shareholders and non-shareholder insiders. 
One issue is that market participants might infer non-public information based on the size 
o f a bonus. Another issue is that non-public information is non-verifiable. In this case, 
firms depend on relational contracts to enforce bonus payments based on non-public 
information. Relational contracts are governed by the company’s reputation, so it is not 
necessary for the information to be verifiable or public.
The first scenario considered is where the payments to the manager might provide 
information to the public. The manager’s bonus is dependent on the success or failure of 
the firm’s project. Under the first-best contract, managers receive their salary after the 
contract is agreed upon and the bonus is received when the project is successful. Another
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scenario that is described is the second-best incentive contract when the project’s 
outcome is publicly observable. This contract maximizes the firm’s profits, while 
satisfying the manager’s individual rationality constraint. The manager exhibits more 
effort and takes on more risk as the amount o f the bonus increases, so the salary must also 
be increased to compensate.
Incentive contracts are analyzed in the case when the board and the manager are 
able to observe the project’s outcome before market participants. The timeline begins 
with the board offering a contract to the manager. When the contract is accepted by the 
manager, the manger receives a salary and chooses his level o f effort. Later the outcome 
of the project is observed by the insiders and if the project was successful, the manager 
receives a bonus. After market participants observe the bonus payment, there is a round 
o f trading. Then the returns from the project are made public, the firm is liquidated, and 
the ‘terminal’ value is realized. The terminal value is not a reflection of the actual returns 
from the project. Three types o f equilibrium contracts are described. Efficient separating 
contracts have a “one-to-one mapping from project outcomes to bonus payments and 
second-best effort and risk sharing”, inefficient separating contracts have a “one-to-one 
mapping from outcomes to bonuses, but induce higher effort and place more risk on the 
manager, compared to the second-best contract”, and pooling contracts “do not depend on 
the project outcome...no output-contingent bonuses are paid” (Hayes and Schaefer 2005, 
438).
It is assumed that the board selects contract and bonus amounts to maximize the 
weighted average of the firms’ short-term market value (weight=£) and its terminal value 
(weight= k-\). The variable k  represents a firm’s myopia. A myopic firm values high
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short-run share prices. A firm that values high short-term share prices may wish to pay a 
bonus to give the appearance of a successful project. Equilibrium contracts have a no­
mimic constraint, meaning that the firms with unsuccessful projects will not give a bonus. 
In this case, the short-term and terminal values are equal. The equilibrium contract for 
firms that place a low weight on k is an efficient separating contract. When the value o f k 
is higher, the equilibrium contract will be the high-profit contract that satisfies no-mimic 
and individual rationality constraints or the pooling contract. If the value o f k is even 
higher, the equilibrium contract is a pooling contract because a separating contract is too 
costly. The more myopic a firm is, the more the manager must be compensated for the 
additional risk and cost assumed, thereby lowering a firm’s profits.
The next model considered is one in which the firm does not have an incentive to 
increase short-term share prices, and relies solely on their reputation to enforce the 
contract. These relational incentive contracts are analyzed in a repeated-game setting. 
An impatient firm is a firm that seeks to shift the cash flows from the future (project 
returns) to the present (not giving a bonus). If the firm breaches the relational 
psychological contract by not paying a bonus, the manager will no longer trust the firm’s 
contract offers. Since the firm can no longer depend on their reputation as an 
enforcement mechanism, the firm can either offer a pooling contract or shut down. This 
is referred to as the reputational governance constraint.
In the first model, myopia leads to higher bonus offers and lower profits, while 
impatience leads to smaller bonus offers and higher profits in the second model. The 
third model examines the interaction o f these two effects: signaling and relational 
incentive contracts. This model is the same as the previous one except for the added
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assumption that the board maximizes a weighted average o f short-term and end-of-period 
share prices. A firm can deviate from the relational contract in two ways. The first is 
that the firm does not pay a bonus when the project was successful, and the second is that 
the firm pays a bonus when the project was unsuccessful. A different governance 
mechanism is when the firm has an incentive to pay a big enough bonus to separate itself 
from a firm with an unsuccessful project. If the firm pays a bonus when the project was 
unsuccessful, the manager assumes that there is no longer a relationship between the 
project’s success and the bonus and does not exhibit effort in later periods. In 
equilibrium, attempts to mislead the market are unprofitable. When k  is small, the largest 
credible bonus may be too small to yield positive profits for the firm because the best 
option for the firm is to shut down if the relational contract was breached. On the other 
hand, when k  is very large, the credible bonus might be too big to yield positive profits 
for the firm since the firm would rather offer a pooling contract or shut down. For 
intermediate values o f k, the credible bonus results in non-negative firm profits because a 
reputational bonus is feasible. The main finding is that the relationship between 
equilibrium bonus amounts (and therefore profits) and the level of the firm’s myopia, k, is 
non-monotonic.
D uff and Monk (2006)
Duff and Monk (2006) consider the psychological contract held by newly hired 
faculty members o f accounting and finance departments in higher education in the UK 
and Ireland. The motivations for becoming a lecturer and the sources o f occupational 
discontent are examined in this study. Occupational discontent, dissatisfaction with one’s 
job, represents a breach in the psychological contract.
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The sample consists of three cohorts. The three cohorts included appointments 
made January 1998 to December 1999, January 2000 to December 2001, and January 
2002 to December 2003. The response rate o f a questionnaire sent to the individuals 
identified in the cohorts was 37.4% for cohort 1, 43% for cohort 2, and 51.4% for cohort 
3. Exploratory factor analysis was used to analyze the questionnaire items relating to the 
motivations for becoming a lecturer, sources of occupational discontent, and ways the 
career could be improved. Cluster analysis was utilized to examine variations in the 
sample.
The EFA identified four factors that motivate people to become accounting 
academics. In order of highest to lowest level o f importance, they are flexible hours, 
work activities (research and scholarly), idealism (developing the profession while being 
removed from practice), and material rewards. In descending order of importance, the 
factors identified concerning occupational discontent are job demands (undervalued 
effort), rewards and working conditions (salary, promotions, flexibility in work hours), 
sense of detachment (separation from the profession), and poor facilities. The sources of 
occupational discontent are not in line with the motivations for becoming a lecturer. This 
indicates that the psychological contract changed over the two years since the lecturers 
were hired. The respondents indicated that the following factors would make the career 
more attractive: internal recognition, increased time resource, acknowledgement and 
working conditions, improved material rewards, and external opportunities. In the open- 
ended section of the questionnaire, the subjects indicated that an induction process, a 
discussion about teaching, administration, and processes unique to the institution, could 
improve the career.
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The cluster analyses revealed four clusters. The first has the fewest sources o f 
occupational discontent and the highest proportion o f professional qualified accountants. 
The second cluster is the youngest, has the highest proportion o f non-degree holders, and 
the highest score on the factors o f occupational discontent. The third cluster scored the 
lowest on the factors o f occupational discontent and is the only one to have a majority of 
males. Rewards and working conditions is rated as a source of occupational discontent in 
the fourth cluster, which has the lowest proportion o f professional accounting 
qualifications. While variability within the sample exists, demographic information does 
not explain the difference in opinions held by the new academics.
Parker, Nouri, and Hayes (2011)
Large accounting firms may have a ‘move up or move out’ philosophy, where an 
employee’s future with the firm depends on promotions. The firm’s employees are aware 
of this mentality. Employees observe the distributive justice, or the perceived fairness of 
promotion decisions, within their firm. Promotion instrumentality is the belief that if  
employees work hard, they will earn a promotion. This can be considered a 
psychological contract because employees perceive the company will reciprocate their 
effort with a promotion.
It is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between distributive justice 
and promotion instrumentality. A psychological contract breach is when employees 
perceive that promotion decisions were not based on performance. As a result, 
employees may choose to leave the organization. Promotion instrumentality and turnover 
are predicted to have an inverse relationship. It is also posited that promotion 
instrumentality mediates the relationship between distributive justice and turnover.
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Turnover may be affected by the level of performance. Employees who are high 
performers and are not promoted may choose to leave the company. Parker, Nouri, and 
Hayes (2011) predict that the inverse relationship between promotion instrumentality and 
turnover is stronger for high performing employees. A moderating role o f job 
performance on the relationship between distributive justice and turnover is 
hypothesized.
The sample is employees of large public accounting firms. A survey was sent out 
through the firms’ internal mailing. Respondents were given return envelopes to mail 
their completed survey to the researchers. O f the 243 surveys distributed, 116 
respondents returned the survey, though six were unusable. This results in a final sample 
size o f 110 and an effective response rate o f 45%. Turnover intentions, distributive 
justice, promotion instrumentality, and job performance were all measured with 
previously established scales, though the scale for promotion instrumentality was 
modified.
The first two hypotheses were measured using OLS regression. OLS regression 
was used to test the mediation model o f hypothesis three, and it was also used to test the 
moderated model in hypothesis four. The last hypothesis was tested by estimating the 
mediation model from hypothesis three and conditioning it on the moderator using OLS 
regression. All hypotheses were supported. The moderating role o f job performance on 
the relationship between promotion instrumentality and turnover intentions is of 
particular interest because firms want to retain their best employees.
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Williams and Adams (2013)
A longitudinal approach was used to qualitatively study corporate annual report 
disclosures o f NatWest Bank in the UK from 1980 to 1995. Williams and Adams (2013) 
assess whether the disclosures promote transparency and accountability for employees, 
who are significant stakeholders in the bank. Social responsibility is portrayed as 
deregulation. Deregulation led to mergers and acquisitions, causing branches to close 
and employees to lose jobs. Several key issues were identified including: technology and 
branch rationalization, redundancies, staff training/career prospects, mode of 
employment, and staff participation/rewards. Some of these issues affect psychological 
contracts held by the employees.
NatWest increasingly used automated payment facilities and new techniques for 
cash handling to lower the staff costs of these tasks (NatWest, 1980). The time that was 
previously spent on these activities was now used in sales roles. Sparrow (1996) 
suggested the new, outward facing relationship with the customers was a violation o f the 
psychological contract and would cause problems for banks. The annual report 
disclosures failed to include if or how employees’ needs were considered during 
decision-making, despite the fact that the decisions would impact the employees. In 
order to reduce costs, there were staff cuts. The annual report disclosures referred to a 
fall in staff numbers, rather than staff cuts. (Kets de Vries & Balazs, 1997) suggested 
that this was a breach of the psychological contract where employee effort and loyalty 
was exchanged for lifetime employment. The other employee issues were not addressed 
thoroughly in the annual report disclosures, either. Overall, it appears as though the
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disclosures were not influenced by transparency and accountability and the company 
does not genuinely care about its employees.
Summary
In summary, the accounting literature has examined various psychological 
contracts. Employee effort is exchanged for employer support (Smith, 1993), pay raises 
(Martin 1995), promotions (Martin 1995; Parker, Nouri, and Hayes 2011), job security 
(Martin 1995; Herrbach 2001; Williams and Adams 2013), and bonuses (Hayes & 
Schaefer, 2005). Employee effort is also exchanged for a high salary, performance-based 
pay, interesting work, an international experience, career opportunities within the firm, 
career opportunities outside the firm, quality professional training, work autonomy, and 
an enjoyable human environment (Herrbach, 2001). Similarly, employee commitment is 
exchanged for a challenging job and employability (Mac Rory, 1999). One psychological 
contract studied is between the employee and a self-set hurdle rate, where the employee 
expects his or her investment project to be successful if  it meets the self-set hurdle rate 
(Cheng et al., 2003). Schofield (1996) provides recommendations for future 
psychological contracts.
Once a psychological contract has been perceived by an employee, there is a 
chance that it will be breached. Duff and Monk (2006) identify breaches related to job 
demands, rewards and working conditions, sense of detachment, and poor facilities for 
newly hired academics. During an organizational change, such as a merger, 
psychological contracts are often breached (Classe, 2004). Williams and Adams (2013) 
reference the changed relationship between the employees and the customers as a 
perceived breach o f psychological contract. When psychological contracts are breached,
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it can lead to negative outcomes such as absenteeism and sabotage (Bruce, 2001). This 
dissertation extends the literature on psychological contracts by further examining the 
effects o f breaches during mergers and acquisitions.
Mergers & Acquisitions
Introduction
Vitale and Laux (2012) note the importance o f researching mergers and 
acquisitions, since companies frequently engage in them despite the high failure rates. 
Companies merge or acquire in order to achieve growth, improve efficiency, as a defense, 
or for “empire building” (Vitale and Laux 2012, 1211). However, 30% to 50% of 
mergers and acquisitions decrease shareholder value, and 60% to 80% of them do not add 
any shareholder value (Boyle et al., 2012).
Some reasons why mergers and acquisitions fail are “ ...buying for the wrong 
reason, selecting the wrong partner, and buying at the wrong tim e...” (i.e. Armenakis 
1999; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999), (Bellou 2007, 70). Another reason for merger 
and acquisition failures is that the company is paying too high of a price (Marks and 
Mirvis 2011). It is not uncommon for an acquiring firm to pay more than the identifiable 
value o f the target company. An example of an unidentifiable value is talented managers 
(Boyle et al., 2012). “The merger process is not simply about the changes in the balance 
sheet. It also has a lasting impact on the employees of the organizations concerned” 
(Lanigan 2007, 54). According to Classe (2004), ignoring the human aspect o f mergers 
and acquisitions is why companies do not experience the expected benefits from the 
merger and acquisition (M&A).
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“ ...[T]he nature of the psychological contract, and whether it is breached during 
the change, can make the difference between success and failure, Valerie Garrow told the 
Chartered Institute o f Personnel Development’s...annual ‘Psychology at work’ 
conference in December 2003” (Classe 2004, 34). Some of the effects o f psychological 
contract breaches during a merger or acquisition are: voluntary turnover (Cortvriend, 
2004; Searle & Ball, 2004; Shield et al., 2002; Tumley & Feldman, 1998), turnover 
intentions (Cortvriend, 2004; Freese et al., 2011), loyalty (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; 
Tumley & Feldman, 1998), job satisfaction (Bligh & Carsten, 2005), and organizational 
commitment (Bligh and Carsten 2005; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011).
Sparrow (1996a)
During times of change, it is important to consider human resource strategies 
(Hunter, 1995). One strategy is to move towards empowerment and high performance 
work systems. The initial costs are recouped through increased productivity, fewer 
mistakes, and strong relationship banking. Lloyds Bank, which went through a merger in 
1995, determined that it is seven times more expensive to gain a new customer than to 
keep a current one. Another strategy is to sustain costs, quality, and sales by monitoring 
performance, offering incentives, and improving technology. Employees understand that 
changes in the human resource strategy may result in changes in their employment 
relationship, or psychological contract.
Old psychological contracts are those that were formed during times of stable 
employment, while new psychological contracts are developed during times of 
continuous change. The old and new psychological contracts differ in many ways. 
Sparrow (1996a) constructed a table o f these differences based on prior literature (Ehrlich
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1994; Kissler 1994; Morrison 1994; Rousseau 1989; Rousseau 1995; Rousseau and 
Greller 1994; Sparrow 1996b). That table is recreated in Table 1.
Table 1
Comparison o f  Old and New Psychological Contracts
O ld co n tra c t New C o n tra c t
C hange en v ironm en t Stable, short-term focus Continuous change
C u ltu re
Paternalism, tim e-served, 
exchange security for 
com mitm ent
Those who perform  get 
rewarded and have contract 
developed
R ew ards Paid on level, position and status Paid on contribution
M otivational cu rren cy Promotion
Job enrichment, com petency, 
developm ent
P rom otion  bias
Expected, tim e-served, technical 
com petency
Less opportunity, new  criteria, 
for those who deserve it
M obility  expectations
Infrequent and on em ployee's 
term s
Horizontal, used to rejuvenate 
organization, managed process
R ed u n d an cy /ten u re  g u a ra n tee Job for life if  perform




exchange prom otion for more 
responsibility
To be encouraged, balanced 
with more accountability, linked 
to innovation
S tatus Very important
To be earned by com petence and 
credibility
P ersonal developm ent The organization's responsibility
Individual's responsibility to 
improve em ployability
T ru s t High trust possible
Desirable, but expect em ployees 
to be more com m itted to project 
or profession
Employees who are o f a low grade, have a low length o f service, are young, 
and/or are female are expected to have less o f an attachment to the old psychological 
contract. (Sparrow, 1996b) hypothesizes that employees who are steeped in the old 
psychological contract, who have been employed longer, and who have a higher 
psychological attachment will demonstrate a more negative response to the new 
employment relationship. Length of service, older age, and higher grade are used to 
proxy for employees with a higher psychological attachment to the old contract.
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Prior literature provides four types o f middle management mindsets (Herriot 
1995; Herriot, Pemberton, and Hawtin 1996; Holbeche, James, and Wark 1995; Mirvis 
and Hall 1994). Flexers “understand the nature o f the business changes and are prepared 
to accept sideways moves or flexible working patterns”, while the Ambitious “understand 
the implications o f the changes but can still see personal progression for themselves” 
(Sparrow 1996a, 78). Lifers “hanker after a guarantee o f security, believe that experience 
and length o f service are a legitimate basis o f reward and are unimpressed by 
performance-related pay”, and then there are those who are Disengaged “either explicitly 
or implicitly, from the organization and have begun to exhibit withdrawal behavior” 
(Sparrow 1996a, 78). It is hypothesized that the staff will exhibit differential contracts 
that cover these four attitudinal positions. It is believed that if  employees feel they have 
the best contract available, then they will lower their expectations. The last hypothesis is 
that beliefs about the environment placing the cause of contract degradation and locus of 
control beyond the sole responsibility and actions o f the employer will be related to more 
positive levels of commitment and satisfaction.
A UK retail bank that underwent job cuts, experienced changes in the branch 
network and HR framework, and was in the process o f a major customer service initiative 
is examined by Sparrow (1996a). During a change program, the bank discussed 
psychological contracts with its employees. The bank used focus groups and a sample of 
200 employees to create booklets that summarized the change process. MBA students 
then interviewed 45 staff members in order to understand their motivational drivers and 
outlooks about the future. The information gathered by the MBA students was used to 
create a survey about attitudinal dimensions o f the psychological contract. One hundred
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and seven employees completed the survey, which was a 53.5% response rate. Age, 
rank, tenure, and gender were analyzed using t-tests and ANOVA to assess whether there 
are four middle management mindsets. To measure the psychological contract, Sparrow 
(1996a) used The Experienced Managers Questionnaire, developed by Sundridge Park 
Management Centre. Sparrow (1996a) combined all o f the attitudinal statements and 
used principal components analysis to test if  employees exhibit the four mindsets. Locus 
of control was measured using three items, and was used to analyze the hypothesized 
positive relationship between an external locus o f control and commitment and 
satisfaction.
Differences in career opportunities, exit requirements, trust, commitment, and 
satisfaction among age, service, grade, and sex were examined. Dissimilarities in career 
opportunities and exist requirements were found, although these variables were not 
related to trust, commitment, or satisfaction. The results suggest that the expected 
differences in age, service, grade, and sex are stereotypical. As predicted, the subjects 
exhibit four distinct attitudes. Nineteen percent of the sample was classified as 
Ambitious, 37% were considered Flexers, 13% were categorized as Lifers, and 31% were 
Disengaged. Principal components analysis showed that these groups could be broken 
down further, and that there were actually seven distinct groups: frustratedly mobile, still 
ambitious, passive flexibility, guidance seeking, buy me outers, just pay me more, and 
don’t push me too far. Contrary to expectations, locus o f control was not significantly 
related to commitment or satisfaction. A main finding of this study is that it is unlikely 
that communication would change employee attitudes.
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Tumley and Feldman (1998)
Turnley and Feldman (1998) seek to answer the following research questions: 
To what extent do managers in restructuring firms feel their psychological contracts have 
been violated? What are the specific elements of psychological contracts that managers 
feel have been most seriously violated? What are the outcomes of psychological contract 
violations? What are the situational factors that might mitigate severe negative reactions 
to psychological contract violations during restructuring? In order to test these research 
questions, Tumley and Feldman (1998) use a sample o f 541 managers and executive 
level employees. The employees are from three different employment sites. Two 
hundred and twenty-three were from a bank that grew through mergers and acquisitions, 
105 worked for a state agency that went through a major restructuring and reorganization, 
and 213 graduate business school alumni were surveyed. Half o f the alumni have been 
through a downsizing or restructuring in the previous two years.
Psychological contract violation is measured using four items from Robinson and 
Rousseau (1994) and Guzzo, Noonan, and Elron (1994). Violation was scored on a 5- 
point Likert-type scale. To measure the psychological contract, respondents were asked 
to indicate the extent to which sixteen psychological contract elements have been 
violated. These elements consisted o f both monetary and nonmonetary items from prior 
research (e.g. Rousseau 1990). The degree of the restructuring was also measured using 
questions about whether there were a large number o f layoffs, a major reorganization, or 
a merger or acquisition in the last two years. Exit was measured as intention to quit and 
actual job search behaviors. Voice, neglect, and loyalty were also measured using scales. 
The following five situational variables were examined: procedural justice in the layoff
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process as well as in pay raise and promotion decisions; the likelihood of future 
violations; and the quality o f relationships with supervisors and colleagues. Participants 
were asked to rate these situations as low or high.
Though psychological contract violation was measured as a dichotomous variable, 
comments from the subjects revealed that there were actually four different outlooks. 
There were employees who felt pleased with their psychological contract fulfillment, who 
did not think there was a commitment, who indicated their experiences at work were not 
as expected, and the largest group indicated their psychological contracts were seriously 
violated. Employees were more likely to perceive a violation if they felt the organization 
knowingly failed to follow through on commitments or if  the commitments were 
particularly important. One-way ANOVAS were conducted, and it was found that the 
managers who worked in organizations that underwent downsizings, reorganizations, and 
mergers and acquisitions were more likely to perceive violations to their psychological 
contracts compared to employees who worked for companies that did not undergo any 
major changes.
To analyze the elements o f the psychological contract, MANOVA was used. 
Results among the employees who had been through different types o f organization 
change were generally consistent, so results for downsizing are the ones presented. 
Significant violations were found in regards to job security, input into decisions, 
opportunities for advancement, health care benefits, and responsibility and power. 
Subjects indicated their psychological contracts were somewhat violated in terms o f base 
salary, feedback, regularity o f pay raises, supervisor support for work problems, career 
development, training, and bonuses for exceptional work. Employees who worked in a
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more stable environment also felt these elements o f their psychological contract were not 
being met. Managers felt their employers were fulfilling their commitment to overall 
benefits, organizational support for personal problems, job challenge and excitement, and 
retirement benefits. The employees who experienced a merger or acquisition were more 
likely to perceive a violation in their psychological contract related to job security, input 
into decision making, organizational support, and bonuses.
Responses to contract violations were examined. Employees who worked for an 
organization that restructured were significantly more likely to intend to quit their job, 
engage in actual job search behavior, and have less loyalty. There were no significant 
differences in regards to neglect and voice. The effects of the situational factors on the 
dependent variables, overall assessment of the psychological contract violation, intent to 
quit, active job search, voice, commitment, loyalty, and neglect behaviors, were tested 
also. For both justice factors and the quality of working relationships with the supervisor, 
all o f the dependent variables had significant differences, except for neglect. Similarly, 
all of the dependent variables were significant for the likelihood of future psychological 
contract violations. For the quality of working relationships with co-workers, only intent 
to search, loyalty, and neglect were significant.
Hubbard & Purcell (2001)
Hubbard and Purcell (2001) use the term acquisition, as opposed to merger, since 
merger implies that two equal companies are joining and that is rarely the case. Four 
elements of employee expectations are proposed: whether employees have a job/type of 
job, re-socialization, how to fit into the new organization, and learning the cultural 
behavior. It is suggested that these expectations will be mediated by the process phase of
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the acquisition, the employees’ role, and the extent o f the organizational integration. The 
phases of the acquisition process are strategic planning, formal communication, 
implementation, and stabilization. Three roles o f employees are described. ‘Negotiators’ 
are more senior managers who are involved with the acquisition from the start. 
‘Enactors’ are also managers, though they are below the ‘Negotiators’, and they are 
responsible for implementation and communication about the acquisition. ‘Recipients’ 
are employees in non-managerial roles, who do not have input into decisions concerning 
the acquisition, but they are affected by the consequences of these decisions.
Twenty-two interviews were conducted with executives involved with the 
acquisition from five companies that experienced an acquisition within the last two years. 
The focus was on employees from the acquired companies. After the interview, subjects 
were asked to rate their concerns on a scale o f one to five, aiding in the process of 
aggregating opinions. Since the sample size is so small, this is an exploratory study of 
employee expectations. Cases from two of the five companies are presented.
The first case study took place six months after the acquisition. The new 
managing director told employees that “it is business as usual” (Hubbard & Purcell 2001, 
23). Employees found this comment insincere as major changes were implemented with 
little notice. There was no communication about a plan to reduce the number of 
managerial employees until the date to do so was set. Around 40% of regional directors, 
20% of middle operational managers, and the majority of the regional training staff were 
removed (Hubbard & Purcell, 2001). This day was termed ‘Black Monday’ by the 
employees (Hubbard & Purcell, 2001). After the layoffs, lower level Negotiators become
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more concerned about the culture, Enactors become more concerned about the 
procedures, and Recipients experienced a decrease in trust.
The second case study was conducted twenty months after the acquisition. 
Employees were told that there would not be very many modifications, but major changes 
in procedures and culture took place. Overall, the redundancies were handled fairly, 
according to employees. After the initial concern about job security subsided, 
Negotiators focused on their status and the new differences, and later become concerned 
about career development. Enactors were worried about the cultural and procedural 
differences and were less pleased with their career development compared to employees 
from the acquiring company.
Based on the case studies, seven elements o f expectations are presented. They are 
quality o f communication, believability o f information, trust in management action, 
credibility o f leadership, fairness o f action, consistency of action and communication, and 
logic o f management action or behavior. Trust and management credibility are based 
somewhat on management actions, but “the way in which actions were conducted and 
explained to employees appeared to be the most important” (Hubbard & Purcell 2001, 
31). “Acquisitions constitute a likely breach in the psychological contract in a 
particularly complex and multi-faceted way”, which may contribute to acquisition failure 
(Hubbard and Purcell 2001, 31).
Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson (2002)
National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in Britain have undergone major 
organizational changes. In 1990, the Community Care Act was passed, which established 
an internal market. The internal market separated those who provide health care from
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those who purchase health care. One trust director formed a Strategy Group, consisting 
o f general managers and clinical directors, in 1991. After analyzing the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, it was determined that the current hospital trust 
was too small. This created several incentives for mergers, including market share and 
medical service pressures, as well efficiency and effectiveness issues (Brigg, 2001). A 
merger was officially authorized eight years later. Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson (2002) 
study human resource management and employees’ reactions during the merger and 
accompanying changes.
These newly merged hospitals were studied using observation, interviews, and 
focus groups. It was noted that the psychological contracts from the first employer had 
an effect on the employees’ reaction to the merger and whether they were able to “make 
the most o f the merger” (Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 2002, 361). One hospital did not 
successfully manage human resources, and many employees quit after the merger. The 
hospitals experienced issues due to differing traditions, loyalties, values, procedures, 
culture, poor leadership, uncertainty, and demotivation. It is recommended that 
information should be communicated to employees frequently, specifically information 
pertaining to progress and problems. “In managing change, psychological contracts 
should be deliberately, carefully, and extensively preserved” (Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 
2002, 361).
Cortvriend (2004)
The Labour party gained power in the UK in 1997, and the National Health 
Service has experienced many organizational changes since then, including mergers and 
de-mergers. Though the National Health Service of Britain has undergone many mergers
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and de-mergers, a gap in the literature exists in this area (Cortvriend, 2004). Research 
from the United States and Canada has addressed mergers, and the findings are generally 
consistent with those in Britain. The nurse retention literature has noted management 
style, lack o f communication, and increased stress as motives for the voluntary turnover 
o f nurses (Cangelosi, Markham, & Bounds, 1998; Leveck & Jones, 1996; Martin & 
Mackean, 1988).
Cortvriend (2004) was able to gain access to a Primary Care Trust (PCT). The 
goal was to examine what the employees felt were the most important parts o f the change 
and their psychological contract, as well as their experiences. The specific PCT that was 
studied went through a merger, and then went through a de-merger one year later. The 
sample consists of 31 subjects (administrative staff, senior managers, middle managers, 
allied health professionals, and nurses) who participated in focus groups. An example 
statement was given on a topic in order to begin the discussion. While the employees’ 
experiences during the organizational changes were varied, the overall feelings toward 
the de-merger were much more negative than toward the merger.
An autocratic leadership style led to negative feelings and outcomes, while a 
democratic leadership style led to positive feelings and outcomes. This leads to the 
conclusion that leadership style is related to employees’ feelings. Subjects also discussed 
culture in terms of the relationship between the merging organizations, geographical 
areas merging, and the conflicts and problems that it caused. During the discussion, the 
participants tended to focus on their own role in the changes. When the employees felt 
they were not involved in the merger decisions, they felt disempowered.
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Psychological contracts were also discussed in the focus groups. The subjects 
described communication and consultation as practically non-existent during the merger 
(Cortvriend, 2004). The participants discussed job satisfaction in regards to extrinsic 
factors, such as pay and working conditions. The policies concerning holidays had not 
been addressed. These can be perceived as breaches o f the psychological contract. In 
fact, some people in this organization did leave and others, who ultimately stayed, 
thought about quitting. Also, motivation levels changed over time for these employees. 
The mean tenure of the subjects was seventeen years. This may mean their psychological 
contracts were strong, even without a breach of contract. The change and possibility o f 
further changes left the employees feeling uncertain, resigned, uneasy, anguished, 
frustrated, shocked, and/or demotivated (Cortvriend, 2004). This study may have been 
limited by the exploratory nature o f the study and the small sample size.
Searle and Ball (2004)
The purpose o f the Searle and Ball (2004) study is to investigate the role o f trust 
and distrust for those who remain with an organization after it has gone through a merger. 
Differences in trust are thought to relate to the psychological contract and organizational 
justice. Verbal commitments and contextual aspects are two mechanisms o f expectations 
in a psychological contract (Rousseau, 2001). Rousseau's (2004) mechanisms are used to 
determine “how far a leap of trust will be made” (Searle and Ball 2004, 709). Some 
examples o f factors of psychological contracts are promotion, training, and performance.
Organizational justice, including distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, 
is linked to trust (Greenberg, 1987). Distributive justice is based on the fairness of 
decision outcomes, such as employees being let go from the organization. Procedural
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justice is based on the fairness o f the procedures used to reach a decision. An example is 
the fairness of the procedures used to determine which employees to let go. Interactional 
justice is based on the treatment o f the individuals affected by a decision. Interactional 
justice has two dimensions, interactional and informational. Interactional justice is the 
level o f respect with which people are treated, while informational justice is the level of 
communication or quality o f explanations.
One major difference between trust and distrust is the “enduring quality of 
impact” (Searle and Ball 2004, 711). Distrust can form in two different ways. It can 
form as “a consequence o f the absence of confidence in others” or “through perceived 
malice and hostility from others (Govier, 1993)” (Searle and Ball 2004, 711). When 
distrust develops, those left in the organization become information processors and study 
others’ motives (Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein, 1996; Kramer, 1996; Staw, Sutton, & 
Kramer, 2001). Gossip pertaining to managers can also affect trust.
Two confectionary manufacturers merged. Longitudinal data was collected from 
the time the decision was made to consolidation o f the manufacturers in 2000. Interviews 
were conducted in 2000 and again in 2002. In between the interviews, field notes were 
taken during visits. Employees were asked questions about their daily work after the 
takeover and production changes. At the end of the two year time period, only six o f the 
original participants remained with the organization. There were subjects from both 
manufacturers and three of them were first tier management and the other three were 
shop floor staff. Two of the participants were promoted in the time between interviews.
The surviving employees indicated that their job-related expectations, or 
psychological contract, changed. One important aspect identified by the subjects was the
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new benefits. Trust was based on the specific benefits received. One distrust dimension 
was local experience. Distrust actually increased simply from hearing about other 
employees’ experiences. Mistakes were made in the wages and there were delays in the 
correction. This was viewed as a lack o f respect, which is a part o f interactional justice, 
while the delay in corrections was viewed as procedural injustice.
Organizational justice was the most common theme. The two main types of 
issues were procedural and interactional justice; 54% of the trust-related issues pertained 
to these two types o f justice. The survivors felt there was a serious lack o f respect shown 
toward the remaining employees. Interactional justice deteriorated through a lack of 
information. There were procedural justice issues in the consistency, accuracy, and 
application o f new human resource processes. The general outcome was distrust. “Once 
distrust was established in the minds o f survivors, their attention was focused on 
discrepancies, such as broken promises”, or breaches in the psychological contract 
(Searle and Ball 2004, 718).
Bligh and Carsten (2005)
Managers who experience organizational changes, such as mergers, have their 
own psychological contracts. Findings from prior research suggest that communication, 
job security, social support, and work-role stability are important in times of 
organizational change (Guzzo et al., 1994; Marks & Mirvis, 1998; Rousseau, 2001). 
However, managers also play a role in their employees’ psychological contracts. The 
managers are responsible for sharing information about the changes with their employees. 
The purpose o f Bligh and Carsten's (2005) study is to examine psychological contracts 
from a manager’s perspective.
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The sample is comprised of managers from a large healthcare system that went 
through a full-scale merger two years before the sample was collected. Bligh and Carsten 
(2005) interviewed managers from two departments. The first department, the Cardiac 
service line, was in an intermediate stage o f the merger, and the second department, the 
OBG/YN service line, was at a later stage in the merger process. The sixteen nurse 
managers (nine from Cardiac, seven from OBG/YN) participated in one to two hour 
interviews. Their responses were coded as transactional or relational psychological 
contracts, based on the work o f Guzzo, Noonan, and Elron (1994) and Lester et al. 
(2002). In the pattern-level coding, the transactional and relational categories were 
grouped into analytic units and higher-order categories.
Two types o f psychological contracts were discussed during the interviews. 
Upward contracts are contracts between the supervisor and top management, and 
downward contracts are between the manager and their employees. Three main elements 
o f downward contracts emerged. Honest and direct communication is imperative both 
during and after the changes. In order to alleviate some of the uncertainty, managers 
gave their employees autonomy and discretion. The nurse managers also felt it was 
important to provide emotional support during the change process. Respect was 
mentioned, although less frequently than the other downward contract themes. The most 
frequently discussed upward contract theme was material support and resources, though 
managers were also concerned about relational aspects of their psychological contract. 
The other main theme was strategic communication. Managers most wanted to know 
information regarding the precise nature, timing, and direction o f the merger process.
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Empowerment was also mentioned in the conversations about downward contractual 
elements.
Additional themes that developed throughout the interviews were loyalty and 
commitment. The nurse managers expressed difficulty in giving up old work sites, 
routines, and familiar places. Most o f the topics mentioned were relational aspects of 
psychological contracts, although some were transactional in nature. Work schedules and 
satisfactory work conditions were included as part o f the downward contracts. The 
frustration o f changing job descriptions was considered part o f the upward contracts. The 
managers’ main focus on relational parts o f the psychological contract is consistent with 
prior literature (Herriot, Manning, and Kidd 1997). Herriot, Manning, and Kidd (1997) 
found that lower level employees tended to place more emphasis on the transactional 
aspects o f the psychological contract.
While the conclusions o f the study by Bligh and Carsten (2005) are limited by its 
small sample size o f sixteen nurse managers, the findings showed transactional elements 
may be more important to managers immediately after a merger. When the contracts are 
reestablished, the managers should be able to pay more attention to the relational parts of 
their psychological contracts. Those who were interviewed expressed that they felt 
lonely and did not communicate very often with their peers. It is suggested that support 
can be provided even with small gestures such as phone calls, timely inquiries, or tokens 
of appreciation and recognition (Bligh & Carsten, 2005).
Bellou (2007)
Mergers and acquisitions are examples o f extreme organizational change, which 
can be threatening to employees (Saunders & Thornhill, 2003). It has been found that
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organizational changes may lead employees to reexamine their psychological contract 
(Wiesenfeld & Brocker, 1993). It has also been found that monitoring employees’ 
psychological contracts is important to achieve expected outcomes from mergers and 
acquisitions (Shield et al., 2002). Yet, research in this area is limited, particularly 
empirical studies. Bellou (2007) focuses on the changes in the psychological contracts 
during the merger and acquisition process by comparing the ‘previous’ and the ‘current’ 
contracts. A ‘previous’ psychological contract “refers to the contract developed between 
employees and the pre-merger/acquisition organization (Bellou 2007, 69). Psychological 
contracts that “emerged with the post-merger/acquisition organization” are termed 
‘current’ (Bellou 2007, 69). Bellou (2007) predicts employee perceptions relating to 
organizational obligations and contributions will change during a merger/acquisition. 
She also hypothesizes that the employees who feel less able to manage organizational 
changes successfully are more likely to believe organizational obligations and 
contributions have changed because of a merger or acquisition.
Greek organizations that had been through a merger or acquisition in the last three 
years, had 1,000 to 2,000 employees, and had offices located in Athens were asked to 
distribute a questionnaire to their employees. The sample consisted o f non-managerial, 
full-time employees who worked for at least six months before the merger or acquisition. 
O f the 450 surveys that were handed out, 255 of the surveys were complete and usable, 
resulting in a 56.7% response rate. Items developed by Rousseau (1990) and Roehling et 
al. (2000) were used to measure the previous and current psychological contracts. The 
subjects were asked to indicate the extent to which their employer was obligated to 
provide them with certain items. They were also asked the extent to which their
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employer actually provided those items. The items were opportunity to promote, high 
pay, pay according to performance, continuous education, long-term employment, 
personal development, support for personal problems, interesting work, involvement in 
decision-making, and recognition. The objective was to measure changes in the 
psychological contract, not contract breaches. Employees’ coping ability was also 
measured, using items developed by Judge et al. (1999). Factor analysis was used first to 
test whether the items represented a single construct for the previous and the current 
psychological contracts. T-tests were used to test the hypotheses.
As expected, employees’ perceptions changed for six out o f the ten obligations. 
After the merger or acquisition, perceptions lowered for pay according to performance, 
long-term employment, support for personal problems, involvement in decision-making, 
and recognition, whereas perceptions rose for continuous education. Perceptions 
remained stable for opportunity to promote, high pay, personal development, and 
interesting work. Employees’ perceptions changed for nine out o f ten contributions as 
predicted. The only one that did not change was continuous education. The overall 
results suggest that after the merger or acquisition process, employees give credit to the 
organization for more transactional obligations (Bellou, 2007).
The results provide support for the hypothesis that the employees who do not feel 
able to manage organizational changes successfully are more likely to believe 
organizational obligations and contributions have changed. The employees who did not 
trust themselves in managing changes believed there were major changes in six o f the ten 
obligations. This group of employees believed that the post-merger organization had less 
o f an obligation to deliver high pay, pay according to performance, long-term
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employment, involvement in decision-making, and recognition. On the other hand, the 
workers who did trust themselves to effectively manage change believed the post-merger 
organization had more o f an obligation to provide continuous education. None o f the 
other obligations changed. The employees who felt they were less able to successfully 
deal with changes indicated nine of the ten contributions changed. Again, continuous 
education was unchanged. Participants who were more confident in their coping abilities 
believed the only contribution that changed was support for personal problems. The 
overall findings reveal that employees’ coping ability significantly affects their 
perceptions o f changes in the psychological contract.
Freese, Schalk, and Croon (2011)
The psychological contracts perceived by employees are impacted by 
organizational changes. The contract may be influenced by the consequences in the work 
situation, changes in the work atmosphere, and/or the implementation process (Schalk, 
Campbell, & Freese, 1998). It is investigated whether the perception of an organizational 
change leads to changes in employees’ psychological contracts (Freese, Schalk, and 
Croon 2011). They hypothesize that the changes decrease the fulfillment o f perceived 
organizational and employee obligations, and that the changes will increase the amount 
o f psychological contract violations. It is also posited that the lack o f fulfillment, or the 
violation o f perceived organizational obligations, is related to a decreased level of 
perceived employee obligations.
Organizational commitment and intention to turnover are analyzed as outcomes. 
Two types of organizational commitment from the Organizational Commitment Model 
(Meyer & Allen, 1991) are o f interest, affective and continuance. Affective commitment
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is “the emotional attachment to or organization when employees identify with an 
organization and enjoy the membership”, and continuance commitment is “based on the 
perceived costs-benefits evaluation o f maintaining organizational membership” (Freese, 
Schalk, and Croon 2011, 407). The definition o f intention to turnover is based on Lubich 
(1997) as the desire to end employment with an organization. It is additionally 
hypothesized that when psychological contracts are violated more frequently, or if 
perceived organizational obligations are fulfilled to a lesser extent, it is related to lower 
levels o f affective and continuance commitment and higher levels o f intent to turnover. 
Changes in the organization are expected to negatively affect the level o f affective and 
continuance commitment and positively affect the level o f intention to turnover.
Three organizations located in The Netherlands were sampled by Freese, Schalk, 
and Croon (2011). Two of the companies provide home care, while the third hosts 
elderly people. One o f the home care organizations went through a merger that involved 
major restructuring. The elderly homecare company was restructuring tasks in a way 
similar to a merger. All o f the businesses, including the second homecare organization, 
were reorganizing middle management. A questionnaire was distributed to 869 workers 
five months before the restructuring/merger. There were 450 responses (52% response 
rate). A second questionnaire was given one month after the restructuring or merger. Of 
the 450 respondents from the first survey, 245 people completed the second one (59% 
response rate). Those people were given a third survey seven months after the 
restructuring or merger, and 186 employees filled it out (76% response rate).
The survey has six parts beginning with demographic information. The second 
part consists o f five scales about perceived organizational obligations including job
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content, career development, social atmosphere, organizational policies, and rewards 
(Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2008). For all 40 items contained in the five scales, subjects 
were asked if the degree o f fulfillment o f the perceived organizational obligations was 
acceptable or not in order to measure experienced violations. Fourth, in-role and extra­
role employee obligations were assessed using scales also developed by Freese, Schalk, 
and Croon (2008). Affective commitment, continuance commitment, and intention to 
turnover were all measured using items from others’ previously established scales. The 
measure for organizational change asks if  something in the employees’ work or the 
organization changed in the last six months in a yes or no format.
Based on the regression of organizational change on organizational obligations 
and violations, it was found that organizational change has a significant negative effect 
on the fulfillment of some organizational obligations, including organizational policies 
and rewards. However, there were no significant effects on job content, career 
development, or social atmosphere as predicted. Organizational change did have a 
significant impact on the number o f psychological contract violations as hypothesized.
Next, organizational change, organizational obligations, and violations were 
regressed on in-role obligations, extra-role obligations, affective commitment, and 
continuance commitment. Contrary to expectations, organizational change did not have 
an effect on perceived in-role and extra-role employee obligations. A lower level of 
fulfillment o f career development, social atmosphere, and violations did have a negative 
effect on in-role employee obligations. Affective commitment was impacted by lower 
levels of fulfillment of job content and organizational policies, and continuance 
commitment was affected only by organizational policies. The level of fulfillment of
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perceived employee obligations affected intention to turnover, although the level of 
fulfillment o f perceived organizational obligations did not. Organizational changes did 
not significantly influence affective or continuance commitment.
Organizational change was regressed on intention to turnover. Organizational 
change does increase the intention to turnover as hypothesized. All o f the significant 
effects are time-invariant, demonstrating that relationships between variables remained 
constant over the period during which the three surveys were completed. The first time 
the employees were surveyed was five months before the merger or restructuring took 
place. More respondents indicated that a change had taken place at this time than they 
did after the merger. Freese, Schalk, and Croon (2011) interpret this as continuous 
organizational change.
Summary
Many companies experience major organizational changes including mergers 
(Sparrow 1996a; Tumley and Feldman 1998; Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 2002; 
Cortvriend 2004; Searle and Ball 2004; Bligh and Carsten 2005; Bellou 2007; Freese, 
Schalk, and Croon 2011), de-mergers (Cortvriend, 2004), acquisitions (Turnley and 
Feldman 1998; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011), and restructuring/reorganization 
(Cangelosi, Markham, and Bounds 1998; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011). Researchers 
have studied the changes in psychological contracts as a result o f organizational change 
(Sparrow 1996a; Searle and Ball 2004; Bellou 2007; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011). 
Bligh and Carsten (2005) examined changes in manager’s upward and downward 
psychological contracts.
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Negative outcomes are associated with these changes in the psychological 
contracts from major organizational changes. They include turnover (Hubbard and 
Purcell 2001; Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 2002; Cortvriend 2004; Searle and Ball 2004), 
turnover intentions ( Turnley and Feldman 1998; Cortvriend 2004; Freese, Schalk, and 
Croon 2011), loyalty (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Tumley & Feldman, 1998), job satisfaction 
(Bligh & Carsten, 2005), and organizational commitment (Bligh and Carsten 2005; 
Freese, Schalk, and Croon 2011). These outcomes were found using several different 
methods: interviews (Bligh & Carsten, 2005; Searle & Ball, 2004; Sparrow, 1996b), 
surveys (Bellou, 2007; Freese et al., 2011; Sparrow, 1996b; Tumley & Feldman, 1998), 
and focus groups (Cortvriend, 2004; Sparrow, 1996b). Other negative outcomes are 
plausible, but they have not been analyzed in an organizational change setting at this 
time.
Hypothesis Development
A psychological contract breach means “not only that a promise has not been met, 
but also that [the employee] has made contributions in exchange for that promise that 
have not been adequately reciprocated” by the employer (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 
239). A psychological contract is considered relational when it “entails broad, open- 
ended and long-term obligations” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 229), while 
transactional psychological contracts are “specific, short-term, and monetizable 
obligations entailing limited involvement of the parties” (Morrison and Robinson 1997, 
229). Pay raises, promotions, and bonuses are transactional psychological contract 
elements that are frequently affected by mergers and acquisitions. Relational 
psychological contract elements commonly impacted during organizational changes
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include job security, job responsibilities, and career development. Each element is 
analyzed separately since employees’ reactions to psychological contract breaches may 
differ depending on what was breached. Also, employers may be able to reciprocate on 
one element, but not another. Using three elements o f each type o f psychological 
contract also allows for a more general comparison between transactional and relational 
psychological contract breaches.
Morrison and Robinson (1997) contend that employees are less likely to perceive 
a breach in relational psychological contracts, and more relational expectations may be 
better able to endure threats to the psychological contract (Rousseau, 2004). Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that more perceived breaches in transactional psychological contracts are 
also expected in a merger and acquisition setting. Promotions, pay raises, and bonuses 
are transactional psychological contracts and therefore, are predicted to be more frequent 
than the relational psychological contracts, which are job security, career development, 
and job responsibilities.
H I: Transactional psychological contract breaches are perceived more
frequently than relational psychological contract breaches.
As a result o f breaches in psychological contracts during mergers and 
acquisitions, employees may experience feelings of violation, which are “affective and 
emotional experience[s] o f disappointment, frustration, anger, and resentment that may 
emanate from an employee’s interpretation o f a contract breach and its accompanying 
circumstances” (Morrison and Robinson 1997). Feelings o f violation differ from a 
psychological contract breach, which is a perception. Using factor analysis, Robinson
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and Morrison (2000) find that psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation are 
separate constructs.
Morrison and Robinson (1997) contend that when a relational psychological 
contract breach is perceived, the feelings o f violation are stronger. Violations of 
transactional contracts may be remedied with an adjustment to the obligations, but 
violations o f relational contracts may damage the relationship between employer and 
employee (Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau, 1994). Therefore, during organizational 
changes, feelings o f violation resulting from relational psychological contract breaches 
are anticipated to be more severe than when a transactional psychological contract is 
breached.
H2: Feelings o f violation from relational psychological contract
breaches are stronger than feelings o f violation from transactional 
psychological contract breaches.
A positive relationship is hypothesized between the breach of each psychological 
contract and subsequent feelings o f violation.
H3a: There is a positive relationship between a breach in a transactional 
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.
H3b: There is a positive relationship between a breach in a relational 
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.
Equity theory states that employees compare their inputs to their outputs (Adams, 
1965). In the case of a psychological contract breach, the employee perceives that the 
employer has not reciprocated their inputs with the promised outputs. According to the 
equity theory, employees can restore equity by lowering their inputs (Adams, 1965). One
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way employees can do this is by reducing their performance. Similarly, employees can 
reduce their behavior that goes beyond what is expected o f them. Organizational 
citizenship behavior (OCB) “represents individual behavior that is discretionary, not 
directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and in the aggregate 
promotes the efficient and effective functioning o f the organization” (Organ, 1988). Prior 
research has found that breaches in psychological contracts during organizational change 
result in decreased job satisfaction (Bligh & Carsten, 2005). This finding is in line with 
the equity theory. If employees are experiencing inequity, it follows that they are not 
satisfied with their job.
During organizational changes, “the autonomy to act consistently and in 
accordance with deeply-held beliefs may be challenged” (Nesterkin 2013, 577). 
According to the reactance theory, a reduction in autonomy can provoke employees to 
participate in restricted behaviors (Brehm 1966; Brehm and Brehm 1981; Wicklund 
1974). Workplace deviance is “voluntary behavior violating significant organizational 
norms and, in doing so, threatens the well-being o f the organization or its members, or 
both” (Robinson and Bennett 1995). Organizational deviance is directed at the 
organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000).
It is theorized that stronger feelings o f violation will lead to decreased employee 
performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and job satisfaction as well as 
increased organizational deviance.
H4a: There is a negative relationship between feelings of violation and 
employee performance.
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H4b: There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and 
organizational citizenship behavior.
H4c: There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and 
job satisfaction.
H4d: There is a positive relationship between feelings o f violation and 
organizational deviance.
Suazo and Stone-Romero (2011) examine the mediating role o f feelings of 
violation on the relationship between a breach in contract and employee behavior, though 
it was not in an organizational change setting. The authors found that feelings of 
violation mediate the relationship between psychological contract breach and in-role 
performance (Suazo & Stone-Romero, 2011), such that performance was impacted most
for employees who had a stronger emotional reaction to a psychological contract breach.
It is posited that feelings of violation will mediate the direct relationship between 
psychological contract breaches and employee performance in a merger or acquisition 
situation. It is also hypothesized that the direct relationships between psychological 
contract breach and the outcomes o f organizational citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction, 
and organizational deviance are mediated by feelings o f violation.
H5a: Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and employee performance.
H5b: Feelings of violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship 
behavior.
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H5c: Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and job satisfaction.
H5d: Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and organizational deviance.
Organizational justice affects the way employees feel during mergers and 
acquisitions. Based on case studies, Hubbard and Purcell observe “the way in which 
actions were conducted and explained to employees appeared to be the most important” 
to employees during acquisitions (2001, 31). The way decisions are made is a part of 
justice, which is based on the fairness of procedures used to reach a decision. The 
explanations of decisions are also a part o f justice that depends on the level of respect
with which people are treated and the level o f communication or quality o f explanations.
If an employee that experiences a breach o f psychological contract, but believes that the 
outcome, decision-making process, and/or communication is fair, they may not be as 
upset about the breach and experience less feelings of violation. It is hypothesized that 
organizational justice reduces the feelings o f violation from a perceived psychological 
contract breach.
H6: Organizational justice moderates the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation.
Prior research has found that organizational change results in increased turnover 
intentions (Tumley and Feldman 1998; Cortvriend 2004; Freese, Schalk, and Croon 
2011) and increased turnover (Hubbard and Purcell 2001; Shield, Thorpe, and Nelson 
2002; Cortvriend 2004; Searle and Ball 2004) for employees. These studies were able to
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observe how many employees ultimately left the company, but they were not able to 
interview or survey those who left the organization.
Some employees are forced to leave the organization, while other employees 
make the choice to terminate their employment. Employees who leave the organization 
because they have no other choice are Involuntary Leavers. Those who choose to leave 
the organization are Voluntary Leavers. O f the workers who remain with the 
organization, some stay because they have no other choice (Involuntary Stayers) and 
others stay because they choose to (Voluntary Stayers). It is theorized that Voluntary 
Leavers and Involuntary Stayers perceive a higher number of breaches, more severe 
breaches, and stronger feelings o f violation from breaches in the psychological contracts 
than Involuntary Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.
H7a: There are more psychological contract breaches perceived by 
Voluntary Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary 
Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.
H7b: The psychological contract breaches are more severe for Voluntary 
Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and 
Voluntary Stayers.
H7c: Feelings of violation are stronger for Voluntary Leavers and Involuntary 
Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Amazon Mechanical Turk “Workers” were used as the subjects for a survey 
testing the effects o f psychological contract breaches during mergers and acquisitions. 
Established, Likert-type scales are used to measure psychological contract breaches, 
feelings o f violation, and the outcomes o f employee performance, organizational 
citizenship behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance. All items are self- 
reported. The hypotheses are tested using ANOVA and Structural Equations Modeling.
Participants
Participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk completed a survey. The 
“Workers” on Mechanical Turk choose the tasks they wish to complete, which are called 
Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). To improve the quality of the data, the initial 
qualifications were set so that the respondents needed to have a 97% accuracy rating, 
meaning that they have successfully completed 97% of the Human Intelligence Tasks 
(HITs) attempted. They were also required to have completed at least 50 HITs and have 
a registered address in the United States. If the “Workers” did not meet these initial 
qualifications, they were not able to access the survey. Before they are hired, though, 
they are voluntarily screened to be sure that they meet the study’s specific requirements. 
“Workers” for this study must have worked or currently work for a company that has
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experienced a merger or an acquisition in the United States in order to participate in the 
study (and hence get paid).Of the 1,507 people who started the survey, 864 of them did 
not qualify because they did not work or previously work for a company that experienced 
a merger o f acquisition. An additional 32 participants did not qualify for the survey 
because the company was located outside o f the United States. Nineteen qualified 
respondents were removed from the survey for failing one of three attention check 
questions. Ninety-two people did not finish the survey. A total of 500 complete 
responses were collected from Mechanical Turk.
Seven respondents were removed from the Mechanical Turk sample. One subject 
took the pilot test; one did not correctly enter the survey code on Mechanical Turk; two 
submitted the survey twice; and three did not provide the name of the company for which 
they worked. Of the 493 usable responses, the average age is 34 years old, 62.5% are 
male, and the mean tenure with the company is almost seven years. Also, 46.9% are 
employees with no managerial duties (rank=l), 22.7% are lower level management 
(rank=2), 22.5% are middle level management (rank=3), 3.2% are top level management 
(rank=4), and 4.7% are professionals (rank=5). Males and females were coded one and 
two, respectively. This information is displayed in Table 2. The minimum age 




Mean Median Range Std. Dev.
Tenure 6.8 5.0 45.5 5.3
Age 34.4 32.0 51.0 10.1
Rank 3.0 3.0 4.0 1.1
Gender 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.5
Survey Design
The survey consists o f established scales for psychological contract breaches, 
feelings o f violation, job satisfaction, organizational deviance, performance, 
organizational citizenship behaviors, and organizational justice. The respondents are also 
asked about the company, their employment status, and demographic information. To 
ensure active participation, three attention checks are used throughout the survey. The 
average completion time was 13 minutes. Each participant who passed all o f the 




Pay raises, promotions, and bonuses are common elements o f transactional 
psychological contracts that are affected by mergers and acquisitions. Elements of 
relational psychological contracts frequently impacted during organizational changes 
include job security, job responsibilities, and career development. Each element is tested 
as a separate psychological contract in order to identify the individual effects a merger or
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acquisition has on the various elements o f the psychological contract. The extent o f a 
psychological contract breach is measured using a five item, global measure (Robinson & 
Morrison, 2000), which was modified to refer to each of the six psychological contract 
elements. Respondents indicate the extent of the perceived breach on 5-point Likert-type 
scales. A high score indicates a more severe breach. Some of the items, as modified for 
the psychological contract breach promotion, are “I have not received everything 
promised to me [about promotions] in exchange for my contributions” and “My employer 
has broken many o f its promises [about promotions] to me even though I’ve upheld my 
side o f the deal” (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). The reported coefficient alpha for these 
items is 0.92 (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). The scale is used six times in this study, and 
the reliabilities are 0.94 to 0.95.
Organizational Justice
Organizational justice is tested with a scale developed by Ambrose and Schminke 
(2009). An overall justice scale is used because it has been suggested that the specificity 
o f justice measurement should match the specificity o f measurement used for the 
outcomes (Colquitt & Shaw, 2005). In this case, global measures are used for the 
outcomes, so a global scale is used for justice, too. The measure for organizational 
justice consists o f six items, including “Overall, I’m treated fairly by my organization” 
and “For the most part, this organization treats its employees fairly” (Ambrose and 
Schminke 2009). The items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale that ranges from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. The alpha for the overall justice scale is 0.93 




Feelings of violation are associated with a specific element o f a psychological 
contract breach. Feelings o f violation from a breach in raises, bonuses, promotions, job 
responsibilities, job security, and career development are measured individually. 
Feelings o f violation are measured using a global scale with four items, modified for 
each psychological contract element. The items for feelings of violation from a 
psychological contract breach in job responsibilities, for example, include “I feel a great 
deal o f anger toward my organization [over job responsibilities]”, “I feel betrayed by my 
organization [with regard to job responsibilities”, “I feel that my organization has 
violated the contract [about job responsibilities] between us”, and “I feel extremely 
frustrated by how I have been treated by my organization [relating to job 
responsibilities]” (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). The responses ranged from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The reported coefficient alpha for this scale is 0.92 
(Robinson & Morrison, 2000). In this study, the scale is used six times, and the 
reliabilities are 0.95 to 0.96.
Employee Performance
Employee performance was measured as in-role behaviors (Williams and 
Anderson 1991). In-role behaviors are those that are explicitly expected o f an employee. 
This is a seven item scale and includes statements such as “Adequately completes 
assigned duties” and “Performs tasks that are expected o f him/her”. Williams and 
Anderson's (1991) results demonstrate that in-role behaviors and OCBs are separate
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constructs. This scale is also scored on a typical 5-point Likert-type scale. The reported 
reliability for this scale is 0.91 (Williamson, 1981), and is 0.88 in this study. 
Organizational Citizenship
The OCBs examined are those that benefit the organization. Organizational 
citizenship was measured using Lee and Allen's (2002) organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCB) towards the organization scale. The scale consists o f eight items. 
Examples are “Defend the organization when other employees criticize it” and “Offer 
ideas to improve the functioning o f the organization” (Lee & Allen, 2002). The scoring 
is on a traditional Likert-type scale with five options ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. This scale has a reported reliability o f 0.88 (Lee & Allen, 2002). The 
reliability in the current study is 0.92.
Job Satisfaction
The scale used to measure job satisfaction is an abridged version of the original 
Job in General (JIG) scale created by (Ironson, Smith, Brannick, & Gibson, 1989). The 
abridged JIG scale consists o f eight adjectives and short phrases and the respondents 
indicate whether the word or phrase describes his/her job (Russell et al., 2004). The 
subject selects “yes”, “?”, or “no”, and this is scored as 3, 1, and 0, respectively. While 
the original JIG scale contained eighteen items, the eight items of the abridged version 
consist o f “good,” “undesirable,” “better than most,” “disagreeable,” “makes me 
content,” “excellent,” “enjoyable,” and “poor.” This scale was selected since it is more 
efficient and the general nature allows the scale to be used across industries and ranks. 
The abridged scale has a reported alpha coefficient of 0.85 (Ironson et al., 1989). The 
reliability in this dissertation is 0.93.
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Organizational Deviance
Organizational deviance is analyzed using the scale developed by Bennett and 
Robinson (2000). The scale includes twelve deviant behaviors that vary in seriousness. 
Examples are “Neglected to follow your boss’s instruction”, “Littered your work 
environment”, and “Taken property from work without permission”. Subjects are asked 
to indicate on a scale o f one to seven how often they engage in a particular behavior. The 
scale anchors are never (1), once a year (2), twice a year (3), several times a year (4), 
monthly (5), weekly (6), and daily (7). The reported Chronbach’s alpha for these items is 
0.81 ((Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The reliability in the current study is 0.85. 
Employment Status
Employment status is assessed by asking respondents to select the statement that 
best describes their employment status. The following statements were used to 
categorize subjects into four employment status classifications: “I have stayed with the 
company because I wanted to stay” Voluntary Stayers); “I have stayed with the company 
because I can’t leave” (Involuntary Stayers); “I left the company because I wanted to 
leave” (Voluntary Leavers); and “I left the company because I had no other choice” 
(Involuntary Leavers). These statements are based on category descriptions used by 
(Hon, Mitchell, Lee, and Griffeth 2014).
Demographic Variables 
Groups that have been assumed to have lower psychological attachment to the old 
employment relationship are employees o f a low rank, with a shorter tenure, young, 
and/or female (Turnley & Feldman, 1998). Therefore, rank, tenure, age, and gender are 
included as control variables. The options for rank are: employee with no managerial
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duties, lower level management, middle level management, top level management, and 
professional. Tenure and age are measured in years.
Hypothesis Testing
HI: Transactional psychological contract breaches are perceived more
frequently than relational psychological contract breaches.
Promotions, pay raises, and bonuses are the transactional psychological contract 
breaches predicted to be more frequent than the relational psychological contracts, which 
are job security, career development, and job responsibilities. The frequency of 
psychological contract breaches is based on the average scores on the psychological 
contract scales. The psychological contract breach scale consists o f five items on a scale 
o f 1 to 5 (l=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4=Agree; 
5=Strongly Agree). Frequency is measured as the number o f average breach scores that 
are greater than or equal to 3.5, which is the mid-point between Neither Agree nor 
Disagree and Agree. At 3.5, the average response is no longer neutral and indicates 
agreement with a psychological contract breach. The maximum possible number of 
transactional psychological contract breaches is three, as is the maximum for the number 
o f relational psychological contract breaches. This hypothesis is tested using a paired- 
sample t-test.
H2: Feelings of violation from relational psychological contract
breaches are stronger than feelings of violation from transactional 
psychological contract breaches.
The feelings o f violation from breaches o f relational psychological contract (job 
security, career development, and job responsibilities) are predicted to be stronger than
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the feelings o f violation from the breaches o f transactional psychological contracts 
(bonus, promotion, and pay raises). Only the respondents who experienced at least one 
transactional and one relational breach are included in the sample for this test. The 
severity o f feelings of violation from transactional psychological contract breaches is 
measured as the average of the scores on the feelings of violation scales associated with 
the transactional psychological contract breaches that were experienced by each 
respondent. Respondents may have experienced one, two, or three breaches based on the 
calculation in hypothesis 1. Severity o f feelings o f violation from relational 
psychological contract breaches is measured in the same way. This hypothesis is also 
tested using a paired-sample t-test.
H3a: There is a positive relationship between a breach in a transactional 
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.
H3b: There is a positive relationship between a breach in a relational 
psychological contract and associated feelings o f violation.
Each subject is asked about the six psychological contract breaches and the 
associated feelings o f violation, which are tested using six different models. These 
relationships are tested with Structural Equations Modeling. The relationship between 
the breach and feelings o f violation is depicted as H3 in Figure 1.
H4a: There is a negative relationship between feelings of violation and 
employee performance.
H4b: There is a negative relationship between feelings of violation and 
organizational citizenship behavior.
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H4c: There is a negative relationship between feelings o f violation and 
job satisfaction.
H4d: There is a positive relationship between feelings o f violation and 
organizational deviance.
The relationship between feelings o f violation and the outcomes of job satisfaction, 
organizational citizenship behaviors, organizational deviance, and employee performance 
are shown as H4 on Figure 1. Structural Equations Modeling is used to test these 
hypotheses.
H5a: Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and employee performance.
H5b: Feelings of violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship 
behavior.
H5c: Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and job satisfaction.
H5d: Feelings o f violation mediates the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and organizational deviance.
The same dependent variables are used in each of the six models. These 
relationships are also tested using Structural Equations Modeling. The hypothesized 
mediated relationship is labeled H5 on Figure 1.
H6: Organizational justice moderates the relationship between
psychological contract breaches and associated feelings of 
violation.
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Organizational justice is tested as a moderator using Multiple Group Analysis and 
Structural Equations Modeling. The predicted moderation is shown as H6 in Figure 1.
Theorized Model: Hypotheses 3,4, 5, & 6
Employee Perform ance 
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Figure 1 -  Theorized Model
H7a: There are more psychological contract breaches perceived by 
Voluntary Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary 
Leavers and Voluntary Stayers.
H7b: The psychological contract breaches are more severe for Voluntary 
Leavers and Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and 
Voluntary Stayers.
80
H7c: Feelings o f violation are stronger for Voluntary Leavers and 
Involuntary Stayers than Involuntary Leavers and Voluntary 
Stayers.
Frequency o f psychological contract breaches is calculated the same as in 
Hypothesis 1, which is the number of psychological contract breach averages that are 3.5 
or over. In Hypothesis 7, however, all psychological contract breaches are considered 
simultaneously, such that the highest possible number o f psychological contract breaches 
is 6, versus three in Hypothesis 1. The severity o f psychological contract breaches is 
measured as the average psychological contract breach score, which can range from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The severity o f feelings o f violation is 
measured as it was in Hypothesis 2, where only the respondents with at least one 
transactional and one relational breach are included in the test, and the feelings of 
violation associated with the breaches actually experienced are averaged. Three, one­
way ANOVAs are conducted to test for differences in frequency and severity of 
psychological contract breaches and the severity o f feelings o f violation between 




A pilot study was successfully conducted to ensure the intended sample of 
employees who have been through a merger or acquisition could be collected using an 
online survey on Mechanical Turk. It took an average o f thirteen minutes for participants 
to successfully finish the survey. They were paid $2 each for their responses. The 
Structural Equations Model contains 44 scale items. It is recommended to have at least 
five to 10 observations per scale item (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010). 
Five hundred Mechanical Turk Workers who have been through a merger or acquisition 
completed the survey. Seven responses were excluded from the final sample. Three 
respondents did not provide a company name, one respondent already took the pilot 
study, another respondent did not accurately submit his response to Mechanical Turk, and 
two responses were submitted twice (only one response per Worker was kept) for a final 
sample size of 493.
Attention Checks
Three attention checks were included in the survey to ensure that the participants 
remained observant. They were “For this question, mark Neither Agree nor Disagree”, 
“Please select Disagree”, and “Choose Agree as the answer to this question”.
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Respondents were removed from the survey after missing one attention check, and their 
responses were not used. Those who were removed from the survey did not receive 
payment
Demographic Information
Five subjects chose not to disclose their age, and one subject did not provide his 
tenure with the company. Because the responses were otherwise complete, the mean age 
and tenure was used for these participants. This method is appropriate when the amount 
of data missing is small and randomly occurring, as in this study (Hair et al., 2010). The 
average age is 34 years old, with a range o f 18 to 69 years old. 62.5% of the sample is 
male. Males were coded as one (1), and women were coded as two (2). The mean tenure 
with the company is almost seven years, ranging from half o f a year to 45.5 years. 46.9% 
are employees with no managerial duties (rank=l), 22.7% are lower level management 
(rank=2), 22.5% are middle level management (rank=3), 3.2% are top level management 
(rank=4), and 4.7% are professionals (rank=5). This information is tabulated and 




Demographic Information: Correlation Table
C orrela tion
R ank-Tenure 0.228***
T enure-G ender 0.052
Tenure-A ge 0.493*
Rank-Age 0.154***
G ender-A ge 0.115**
R ank-G ender -0.082*
***Significant at p=0.01 
**Significant at p-0.05 
*Significant at p = 0 .10
Control Variables
The control variables o f rank, age, tenure, and gender were included in the model, 
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Figure 2 Theorized Model with Control Variables
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The controls were correlated with the endogenous construct, psychological 
contract breach, which can be seen in Table 4. As mentioned previously, rank was coded 
as follows: employees with no managerial duties (rank=l), lower level management 
(rank=2), middle level management (rank=3), top level management (rank=4), and 
professionals (rank=5). Gender was coded as one for males and two for females. The 
psychological contract breaches of raises, promotions, and career development are 
significantly correlated with tenure. The negative correlations indicate employees with a 
lower tenure perceive more severe psychological contract breaches relating to raises, 
promotions, and career development. The psychological contract breach o f job security 
is significantly correlated with age, such that older employees perceive a more severe 
psychological contract breach in job security.
Table 4
Control Variables: Correlations with Psychological Contract Breaches
Raise Bonus Prom otion
Jo b
Responsibilities
Jo b  Security C areer
Development
Breach-Tenurc -0.116** -0.035 -0.165*** -0.062 -0.050 -0.081
Brcach-Age -0.052 -0.025 41.036 0.011 0.109** 0.036
Breach-Rank -0.075 -0.021 -0.063 -0.015 -0.063 -0.034
B reach-G ender 0.034 0.050 0.000 0.070 0.018 0.008
"""Significant at p=O.OI 
"‘ Significant at p-0.05 
"Significant at p = 0 .10
Relationships between the control variables and the exogenous constructs of 
feelings o f violation, employee performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and 
organizational deviance are also included in the model. The standardized regression 
weights o f these relationships are displayed in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
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Table 5
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control Variables and Feelings 
o f  Violation
Raise Bonus Prom otion
Job
Responsibilities
Jo b  Security
C areer
Development
Violation-Tenure 0.004 0.002 0.041 -0.051 ♦♦ 0.036 0.027
Violation-Age -0.021 0.002 -0.008 0.074** -0.038 -0.030
Violation-Rank -0.026 -0.033 -0.018 -0.003 - 0.011 -0.008
Violation-Gender 0.028 0.021 0.026 -0.031 -0.003 0.003
♦♦♦Significant at p=0.01 
♦♦Significant at p-0.05 
♦Significant at p = 0 .10
Table 6





Jo b  Security
Career
Development
Pcrformance-Tenure 0.002 0.014 0.004 -0.024 0.004 0.015
Performance-Age 0.080 0.081 0.080* 0.126** 0.108* 0.082
Performance-Rank 0.042 0.047 0.047 0.054 0.038 0.049
Pcrformance-Gcnder 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.141***
♦♦♦Significant at p=0.01 
♦♦Significant at p-0.05 
♦Significant at p=0.10
Table 7
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control Variables and 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior
Raise Bonus Prom otion
Jo b
Responsibilities
Jo b  Security
C a reer
Developm ent
O C B -Tenure 0.116** 0.136*** 0.090* 0.097** 0.110** 0.103**
OCB-Age 0.013 0.013 0.037 0.059 0.072 0.049
O C B -R ank 0.146*** 0.161*** 0.153*** 0.167*** 0.143*** 0.157***
O C B -G ender 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.107** 0.109***
♦♦♦Significant at p=O.OI 
♦♦Significant at p-0.05 
♦Significant at p = 0 .10
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Table 8




Responsibilities Job  Security
C areer
Development
Satisfaction-Tenure 0.041 0.070 0.004 0.015 0.025 0.016
Satisfaction-Age -0.170*" -0 .168"* -0.1.14*** -0 .108" -0.072 -0 110**
Satisfaction-Rank 0.067 0.084** 0.070* 0 .1 0 1 " 0.050 0.086**
Satisfaction-Gender -0.028 -0.022 -0.047 -0.021 -0.058 -0.055
***Significant at p=O.OI 
**Significant at p-0.05 
‘ Significant at p=0.10
Table 9
Control Variables: Standardized Regression Weights fo r  Control Variables and 
Organizational Deviance
Raise Bonus Prom otion
Job
Responsibilities
Jo b  Security
C areer
Development
Deviance-Tcnurc 0 .01.1 0.008 0.025 0.036 0.016 0.020
Deviance-Age -0.214*** -0.224*” -0.212*** -0 .257*" -0.245*** -0.2.16*"
Deviance-Rank -0.054 -0.066 -0.065 -0.073 -0.061 -0.069
Deviance-Gender -0 .146"* -0.127*** -0.132*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.127***
“ ‘ Significant at p= 0 .01 
“ Significant at p-0.05 
‘ Significant at p = 0 .10
Feelings o f  Violation 
The results for the relationships between the control variables and feelings of 
violation can be seen in Table 5. Age and tenure are significantly related to feelings of 
violation from job responsibilities. This relationship with age is positive, suggesting that 
older subjects experience higher feelings of violation. The negative relationship between 
tenure and job responsibilities indicates that employees with lower tenure perceive more 
severe feelings o f violation.
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Employee Performance 
Table 6 displays the standardized regression weights for the relationship between 
the control variables and employee performance. Age is significantly related to 
performance in the promotion, job responsibilities, and job security models. Older 
respondents report higher performance. Gender is significantly related to employee 
performance in all six models, which indicates that males report higher performance.
Organizational Citizenship Behavior 
The standardized regression weights for the relationship between the control 
variables and OCB are shown in Table 7. Rank and gender are significantly related to 
organizational citizenship behaviors for all models. Males and those higher ranked in the 
company report higher organizational citizenship behavior. Tenure is significantly 
related to OCB for all psychological contracts except for job responsibilities, such that 
employees with longer tenure report higher organizational citizenship behaviors.
Job Satisfaction
The results for the relationship between the control variables and job satisfaction 
are presented in Table 8. Rank is significantly related to job satisfaction for bonuses, 
promotions, job responsibilities, and career development. The relationship is positive, 
indicating that respondents with a higher rank in the company report higher job 
satisfaction. Age is significantly and negatively related to job satisfaction in all models 
except for job security. This means that older employees report lower job satisfaction.
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Organizational Deviance 
Table 9 displays the standardized regression weights for the relationship between 
the control variables and organizational deviance. Age and gender are both significantly 
related to organizational deviance. Age was negatively related to deviance. Younger 
employees reported participating in more deviant acts than older employees. Gender was 
coded as male=l and female=2, so the negative relationship to deviance suggests that 
males reported engaging in more deviant acts than women.
Dependent T-Tests
Hypothesis 1 Results 
The psychological contract breaches (pay raises, bonuses, promotions, job 
responsibilities, job security, and career development) are measured with a five item, 5- 
point scale (Robinson & Morrison, 2000). For H I, frequency is computed as described 
above. Average psychological contract breach scores above 3.5 are counted, such that 
the highest score possible for the number o f transactional psychological contract breaches 
is three and the highest score possible for the number o f relational psychological contract 
breaches is three. The lowest score is zero. This can be seen in Table 10.
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Table 10








Job Responsibilities 406 87
Job Security 405 88
Career Development 379 144
As seen in Table 1, the most commonly experienced psychological contract 
breach is a breach in career development (29%), followed by raises (23%), promotions 
(23%), bonuses (20%), job security (18%), and job responsibilities (18%). Table 11 
breaks down the frequency o f psychological contract breaches even further. Slightly 
more than half o f the respondents experienced at least one psychological contract breach 
during a merger or acquisition, and eleven of them experienced all six psychological 
contract breaches.
Table 11
Number o f  Participants Who Experienced Psychological Contract Breaches
T ra n sa c tio n a l
B reaches
R ela tiona l
B reaches
All B reaches
0 295 318 242
1 98 89 86
2 68 58 60





A dependent/paired sample t-test is appropriate for HI since two means from the 
same respondents are being compared (mean frequency o f transactional psychological 
contract breaches and mean frequency o f relational psychological contract breaches). The 
assumptions for this test are normality and interval level data. The interval level data 
requirement is met. Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality indicates a 
significant violation from normality for the frequency o f transactional psychological 
contract breaches and the frequency o f relational contract breaches, the distribution 
appears fairly normal. Also, according to the central limit theorem, the sampling 
distribution tends to be normal in large samples (n=30 or more), no matter the shape of 
the actual data (Field, 2009). With the normal appearance and the large sample size, the 
results from the t-test can be interpreted as usual.
The possible scores for frequency of transactional and relational psychological 
contract breaches are 0, 1, 2, or 3. The mean number of transactional psychological 
contract breaches is 0.67, and the mean number of relational psychological contract 
breaches is 0.59. This difference is significant at p=0.042. As seen in Tables 10 and 11, 
Table 10 and Table 11, a large part o f the sample did not experience the 
psychological contract breaches and scored zero for the frequency of psychological 
contract breaches, resulting in the low means of 0.67 and 0.59. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported; transactional psychological contract breaches are perceived more frequently 
than relational psychological contract breaches.
Hypothesis 2 Results 
The respondents who experienced at least one transactional and one relational 
breach (n=122) are used to test this hypothesis. The severity o f feelings o f violation from
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transactional psychological contract breaches is measured as the average of the scores on 
the feelings o f violation scales associated with the transactional psychological contract 
breaches that were experienced by each respondent. Respondents may have experienced 
one, two, or three breaches based on the calculation in hypothesis 1. Severity o f feelings 
o f violation from relational psychological contract breaches is measured in the same way.
A dependent/paired sample t-test is also appropriate for H2 since two means from 
the same respondents are being compared (mean severity o f feelings o f violation from 
transactional psychological contract breaches and mean severity o f feelings o f violation 
from relational psychological contract breaches). The same assumptions apply for this 
hypothesis test. The data is interval level, but the Kolmogorov-Smimov test o f normality 
shows a significant violation from normality for the severity o f feelings o f violation from 
transactional psychological contract breaches and the severity o f feelings of violation 
from relational contract breaches.
The distributions appear close to normal. As with H I, the results from the t-test 
can be interpreted regularly due to the large sample size (Field, 2009). The mean severity 
o f feelings o f violation from transactional psychological contract breaches is 3.95, while 
the mean severity o f feelings o f violation from relational psychological contract breaches 
is 3.80. The difference is insignificant (p=1.00). The results were in the opposite 
direction o f the hypothesis and would have been significant had the hypothesis been 
reversed. Hypothesis 2 is not supported, as the mean severity of feelings of violation 
from relational psychological contract breaches is lower than the mean severity of 




The standardized regression weights, also called factor loadings, indicate 
convergent validity. It is recommended that the standardized regression weights be at 
least 0.50 (Hair et al., 2010). For all six models, there were several items with factor 
scores below the recommended 0.50 threshold, and the items with the lowest factor 
scores were removed first. The smallest factor loading was the fifth item of the 
performance scale, “I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance 
evaluation”, which was removed from all models. Five items from the 12-item deviance 
scale did not meet the 0.50 minimum, and were also removed. The following items were 
removed from the deviance scale: “Discussed confidential company information with an 
unauthorized person”, “Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job”, “Falsified a 
receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses”, 
“Littered your work environment”, and “Taken property from work without permission”. 
Most o f the items dropped from the organizational deviance scale are illegal activities, 
and the ones that remain in the scale have more to do with a lack o f effort. Not only do 
these items not meet the 0.50 minimum, it also makes sense that participation in illegal 
activities does not necessarily correlate with less severe deviant acts. A total o f 38 o f the 
original 44 items remained in the models. The remaining items in all six models have 
standardized regression weights above 0.50.
Model Fit
The fit o f the models was analyzed next. The Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) includes model complexity and the sample size in its
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calculation, which is advantageous over other measures o f fit that could reject models 
that have a large sample size or a large number o f observed variables, both o f which are 
present in this study (Hair et al. 2010, 748). A lower RMSEA indicates a better fit. The 
comparative fit index (CFI) has “relative...insensitivity to model complexity” and is 
another widely used measure o f fit (Hair et al. 2010, 749). The CFI can range from zero 
to one, with a higher number signifying a better fit. For models with sample sizes over 
250 and the number of observed variables over 30, it is recommended that the RMSEA 
be 0.08 or lower, with CFI o f 0.92 or above (Hair et al. 2010, 753). All o f the models 
exhibit good fit, as can be seen in Table 12.
Table 12
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices: Root Mean Square Error o f  Approximation & 
Comparative Fit Index
R M SE A C FI
R aise 0.054 0.933
B onus 0.054 0.933
P rom otion 0.053 0.934
J o b  R esponsib ilities 0.056 0.925
J o b  S ecu rity 0.055 0.934
C a re e r  D evelopm ent 0.054 0.931
Convergent Validity
Convergent validity is defined as the “extent to which a set o f measured variables 
actually represents the theoretical latent construct those variables are designed to 
measure.” (Hair et al. 2010, 771). The Average Variance Extracted and Construct 
Reliability are calculated to assess convergent validity. These tests are based on the 38
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items that remained in the model after Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Items were 
removed from the employee performance and organizational deviance scales. None of 
the items from organizational citizenship behavior and job satisfaction scales were 
removed.
The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was computed for each latent construct. 
The variance extracted is “a summary measure o f convergence among a set of items 
representing a latent construct. It is the average percentage o f variation explained among 
the items” (Hair et al. 2010, 773). As a general guideline, it is recommended that the 
AVE be 0.50 or higher (Hair et al., 2010). In all six models, there is one construct that 
does not meet this recommendation, which is deviance. The AVE for deviance is lower 
than preferred at 0.44 for all psychological contract breaches, as seen in Table 13.
Table 13
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Convergent Validity: Average Variance Extracted
Breach Violation Performance OCB Satisfaction Deviance
Raise 0.79 0.79 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.44
Bonus 0.78 0.87 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.44
Promotion 0.77 0.85 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.44
Job Responsibilities 0.76 0.83 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.44
Job Security 0.81 0.86 0.54 0.58 0.61 044
Career Development 0.77 0.85 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.44
Construct Reliability (CR), which measures the “reliability and internal 
consistency of the measured variables representing a latent construct”, is also used to 
analyze convergent validity (Hair et al. 2010, 771). As a rule o f thumb, the CR should be 
0.7 or higher (Hair et al., 2010). All of the constructs in all of the models meet this 
criterion. This is displayed in Table 14.
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Table 14
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Convergent Validity: Construct Reliability
Breach Violation Performance OCB Satisfaction Deviance
Raise 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85
Bonus 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85
Promotion 0.94 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85
Job Responsibilities 0.94 0.95 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85
Job Security 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85
Career Development 0.94 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85
Though the AVE for deviance is slightly lower than preferred, the 0.50 threshold 
is just a general recommendation, and the CR for deviance is well over the minimum 
recommendation (Hair et al., 2010), so overall, deviance exhibits acceptable convergent 
validity. Based on the factor loadings determined during CFA, the remaining items for 
each construct were tested for convergent validity using the Average Variance Extracted 
and Construct Reliability, and the results o f these tests support convergent validity in all 
of the constructs.
Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity, which is the “extent to which a construct is truly distinct 
from other constructs”, is analyzed using the Squared Interconstruct Correlations, or SIC 
(Hair et al. 2010, 771). The SICs are compared to the Average Variance Extracted. 
Discriminant validity is demonstrated when the AVE is higher than the corresponding 
SICs since it shows that the construct explains its own item measures more than it 
explains a different construct (Hair et al., 2010). The comparisons where the AVE is not 
higher than the related SICs are shown in Table 15.
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Table 15
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Discriminant Validity: Average Variance Extracted &
Squared Interconstruct Correlation
AVE (B rea ch ) S IC  (B rea ch  & V io la tio n )
R aise 0 .7 9 0 .8 2
B o n u s 0 .7 8 0.71
P ro m o tio n 0 .7 7 0 .83
J o b  R e sp o n s ib ilit ie s 0 .7 6 0 .7 3
J o b  S ecu r ity 0.81 0 .8 2
C a r eer  D e v e lo p m e n t 0 .7 7 0 .7 8
Another way to test discriminant validity is to set the covariance between 
psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation to one and observe how the fit 
changes. Discriminant validity is demonstrated if the fit gets significantly worse with the 
fixed covariance (Hair et al., 2010). This test was done on the models for raises, 
promotions, job security, and career development. The fit o f the models with the 
covariance set to one is almost the same as the fit when they are separate constructs. 
These test results indicate that the two constructs may be measuring the same thing, so 
another CFA was conducted with the items for psychological contract breach and feelings 
of violation combined into one construct. When this was done, the fit was actually 
reduced for all four models, contrary to expectation. Though discriminant validity is low, 
the analysis shows that psychological contract breach and feelings of violation are best 
left as separate constructs.
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Nomological Validity 
To check for nomological validity, the correlations between constructs are 
examined to see if they make sense. The correlations for each o f the six models are 
shown in Table 16. A positive relationship between psychological contract breach and 
feelings o f violation is hypothesized, so the positive correlation is expected. 
Psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation are anticipated to have a 
negative relationship with performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, and job 
satisfaction, which is evident in the negative correlations o f these constructs. It also 
posited that psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation will have a positive 
relationship with deviance. The positive correlation between these constructs is in line 
with this prediction. Since performance, organizational citizenship behavior, and job 
satisfaction are all desirable outcomes, it makes sense that these constructs are positively 
correlated with each other. Similarly, because deviance is a damaging outcome, it 
follows that deviance will be negatively correlated with the positive outcomes of 
performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, and job satisfaction. Nomological 
validity is demonstrated or all models in Table 16.
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Table 16
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Nomological Validity: Correlations by Psychological
Contract Breach




Breach-Yiolation 0.904*** 0.843*** 0.910*** 0.855*** 0.903*** 0.884***
Breach-Performance -0.163*** -0.151*** -0.126** -0.212*** -0.192*** -0.119**
Breach-OC'B -0.309*** -0.332*** -0.368*** -0.343*** -0.348*** -0.388***
Breach-Satisfaction -0.412*** -0.499*** -0.491*** -0.544*** -0.588*** -0.593***
Breach-Deviance 0105** 0.111** 0.151*** 0.138*** 0.122** 0.142***
Yiolation-Performance -0.173*** -0.178*** -0.142*** -0.288*** -0.234*** -0.206***
Yiolalion-OCB -0 315*** -0.311*** -0.360*** -0.373*** -0.348*** -0.387***
Yiolation-Satisfaction -0.455*** -0.530*** -0.507*** -0.569*** -0.594*** -0.571***
Yiolation-Deviance 0.194*** 0.148*** 0.163*** 0.187*** 0.153*** 0.161***
Performance-OCB 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.365*** 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.366***
Performance-Satisfaction 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.077 0.078
Performance-Deviance -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297***
OCB-Satisfaction 0.494*** 0.493*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.494***
OCB-Deviance -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.348***
Satisfaction-Deviance -0 165*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0 165*** -0 165*** -0.165***
***Significant at p=0.01 
**Significant at p-0.05  
* Significant at p = 0 .10
Face Validity
Face validity refers to the consistency o f the content of the items with the 
definition o f the construct (Hair et al., 2010). All o f the psychological contract breach 
items refer to promises made and broken by the employer, and the items in the feelings of 
violation scale refer to feelings such as anger, betrayal, and frustration (Robinson & 
Morrison, 2000). The items from Williams and Anderson's (1991) employee 
performance scale pertain to the duties, responsibilities, and requirements o f an 
employee’s job. The items on the organizational citizenship behavior scale include 
statements about pride and loyalty (Lee & Allen, 2002). The scale for job satisfaction 
contains adjectives that are indicative of satisfaction (Russell et al., 2004), and twelve
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organizationally deviant acts o f varying severity make up the organizational deviance 
scale (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The organizational justice scale items refer to 
outcomes, processes, and treatment that affect employees (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). 
Since the meanings of the items are consistent with the construct definitions, face validity 
is established.
S tru ctu ra l E q u a tio n s M od el
The factor loadings from the CFA were compared to the factor loadings from 
SEM. There were not any substantial changes between the loadings, as expected. An 
examination o f the standardized residual covariances and the modification indices 
suggested a closer look at the relationships between deviance, OCB, performance, and 
job satisfaction may be necessary. However, the suggested additional paths are not 
consistent with theory and were not added to the models. The fit of the Structural 
Equations Models is good and meets the recommended guidelines of having RMSEA of 
0.08 or below (Hair et al., 2010). Another recommendation is to have CFI o f 0.92 or 




SEM  Fit Indices: Root Mean Square Error o f  Approximation & Comparative Fit Index
RM SEA C FI
Raise 0.055 0.919
Bonus 0.055 0.920
P rom otion 0.054 0.920
J o b  R esponsibilities 0.056 0.912
J o b  S ecurity 0.055 0.921
C a re e r  D evelopm ent 0.054 0.919
Hypothesis 3 Results 
Descriptive statistics for the individual psychological contract breach and the 
associated feelings of violation are displayed in Table 18, which shows the average score 
for psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation. Both were scored on a scale 
o f one to five. The psychological contracts o f promotion and career development have 
the highest score for psychological contract breach, while job security has the lowest 




Descriptive Statistics fo r  Psychological Contract Breaches and Feelings o f  Violation
M ean B reach  
Score 
(1.00-5.00)
S ta n d a rd
D eviation
M ean F eelings of 
V iolation Score 
(1.00-5.00)
S ta n d a rd
D eviation
R aise 2.60 1.03 2.41 1.12
B onus 2.62 1.00 2.37 1.09
P rom otion 2.68 1.00 2.43 1.09
Jo b  R esponsibilities 2.44 0.95 2.26 1.03
Jo b  S ecu rity 2.41 1.05 2.24 1.11
C a re e r  D evelopm ent 2.68 0.99 2.40 1.08
Hypothesis three states that there is a positive relationship between a breach in 
psychological contract and feelings of violation for transactional and relational 
psychological contract breaches. This relationship is positive and significant for all six 
psychological contract breaches, as seen in Table 19. Hypothesis 3a and 3b are supported.
Table 19
Psychological Contract Breach to Feelings o f  Violation: Expected Sign and Standardized 
Regression Weight
E xpected  Sign Stdz. R egression W eight
Raise 0.901***
Bonus - 0.841***
Prom otion - 0.915***
J o b  R esponsibilities 0.853***
J o b  S ecurity - 0.908***
C a re e r  D evelopm ent - 0.887***
* * * S ig n if ic a n t a t p= 0 .0 1  
* * S ig n if ic a n t a t p -0 .0 5  
^ S ig n if ic a n t a t  p = 0 .10
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Hypothesis 4 Results 
The fourth hypothesis states that the relationships between feelings o f violation 
and employee performance (4a), OCB (4b), and job satisfaction (4c) are all negative, 
while the relationship between feelings o f violation and organizational deviance (4d) is 
positive. Table 20 shows that for four o f the six psychological contract breach models, 
the relationship between feelings o f violation and employee performance are negative 
and significant, as predicted.
Table 21 displays the results for Hypothesis 4b. Five o f the six psychological 
contract breach models show a significant and negative relationship between feelings of 
violation and organizational citizenship behavior. Hypotheses 4a and 4b are partially 
supported.
Table 20
Feelings o f  Violation to Employee Performance: Expected Sign and Standardized 
Regression Weight
E xpected  Sign Stdz. R egression  W eight
Raise - -0.204
Bonus - -0.185*
P rom otion - -0.210
J o b  R esponsib ilities - -0.429***
J o b  S ecurity - -0.322***
C a re e r  D evelopm ent - -0.465***
***Signiflcant at p=0.01 
**Significant at p-0.05 
*Significant at p = 0 .10
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Table 21
Feelings of Violation to Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: Expected Sign and
Standardized Regression Weight
E xpected  Sign Stdz. R egression  W eight
Raise - -0.290**
B onus - -0.116
P rom otion - -0.228*
J o b  R esponsib ilities - -0.339***
J o b  S ecu rity - -0.216*
C a re e r  D evelopm ent - -0.225**
***Significant at p=0.01 
**Significant at p-0.05 
*Significant at p= 0.10
The relationship between the feelings o f violation for raises, bonuses, promotions, 
job responsibilities, job security, career development and job satisfaction are negative and 
significant as predicted, in support o f H4c. When feelings o f violation increase, job 
satisfaction decreases. The results are shown in Table 22.
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Table 22
Feelings of Violation to Job Satisfaction: Expected Sign and Standardized Regression
Weight
E xpected  Sign Stdz. R egression  W eight
Raise - -0.497***
Bonus - -0.364***
P rom otion - -0.343***
J o b  R esponsibilities - -0.388***
J o b  S ecurity - -0.358***
C a re e r  D evelopm ent - -0.225**
***Significant at p=0.01 
**Significant at p-0.05 
*Significant at p=0.10
The relationship between feelings o f violation and organizational deviance is 
significant and positive for four o f the six psychological contract breach models, as 
expected. This means that as feelings o f violation increase, organizational deviance 
significantly increases for raises, bonuses, job responsibilities, and job security. 
Hypothesis 4d is partially supported, and the results are displayed in Table 23.
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Table 23
Feelings of Violation to Organizational Deviance: Expected Sign and Standardized
Regression Weight
E xpected  Sign Stdz. R egression  W eight
Raise - 0.570***
Bonus - 0.199**
P rom otion * 0.209
J o b  R esponsib ilities 0.326***
J o b  S ecu rity - 0.218*
C a re e r  D evelopm ent - 0.164
***Significant at p=0.01 
■"♦Significant at p-0.05 
♦Significant at p = 0 .10
Hypothesis 5 Results 
The indirect effects and residual direct effects are used to determine whether 
mediation is present. The indirect effect is the product of the path from psychological 
contract breach to feelings o f violation and feelings o f violation to employee 
performance, for example. The residual direct effect is the path between psychological 
contract breach and employee performance when feelings o f violation are included as a 
mediator (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). One way to formally test for indirect effects is to 
use bootstrapping to determine the significance of this effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
The percentile confidence intervals method o f bootstrapping was used with a 90% 
confidence level. If the interval includes zero, it indicates that no mediation is present. It 
took 13 iterations for the breach o f raises model, 14 for the breach of bonuses model, and 
12 iterations for the rest o f the models. When the indirect effect is significant and the 
direct effect is not, full mediation is said to have occurred. When the indirect effect and
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the direct effect are both significant, partial mediation is present. The results are shown 
for each psychological contract breach in Tables 24, 25, 26, and 27.
Table 24
Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract Breach & 
Employee Performance Relationship: Significance o f  Standardized Indirect Effect, 
Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship
Indirect Effect 
(p-value)
Residual Direct Effect 
(Stdz. Regression Weight)
Residual Direct Effect 
(p-value)
Mediation
Raise 0.248 0.027 0.832 None
Bonus 0.098 - 0.001 0.989 Full
Promotion 0.169 0.070 0.613 None
Job  Responsibilities 0.010 0.144 0.152 Full
Job  Security 0.037 0.086 0.493 Full
C areer Development 0.010 0.288 0.013 Partial
Table 25
Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract Breach & 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior Relationship: Significance o f  Standardized Indirect 
Effect, Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship
Indirect Effect 
(p-value)
Residual Direct Effect 
(Stdz. Regression Weight)
Residual Direct Effect 
(p-value)
Mediation
Raise 0.112 -0.020 0.866 None
Bonus 0.236 -0.035 0.008 None
Promotion 0.119 -0.136 0.283 None
Job  Responsibilities 0.010 -0.055 0,559 Full
Job  Security 0.089 -0.150 0.196 Full
C areer Development 0.096 -0.181 0.086 Partial
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Table 26
Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract Breach & Job 
Satisfaction Relationship: Significance o f  Standardized Indirect Effect, Standardized 
Regression Weight and Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship
ind irect Effect 
(p-value)
Residual Direct Effect 
(Stdz. Regression Weight)
Residual Direct Effect 
(p-value)
M ediation
Raise 0.010 0.041 0.722 Full
Bonus 0.010 -0.193 0.016 Partial
Promotion 0.010 -0.180 0.132 Full
Job  Responsibilities 0.010 -0.206 0.016 Partial
Job  Security 0.010 -0.252 0.015 Partial
C areer Development 0.085 -0.388 0.000 Partial
Table 27
Mediation Results fo r  Feelings o f  Violation on Psychological Contract Breach & 
Organizational Deviance Relationship: Significance o f  Standardized Indirect Effect, 
Standardized Regression Weight and Significance o f  Residual Direct Relationship
Indirect Effect 
(p-value)
Residual Direct Effect 
(Stdz. Regression Weight)
Residual Direct Effect 
(p-value) M ediation
Raise 0.010 -0.419 0.001 Partial
Bonus 0.122 -0.053 0.577 None
Promotion 0.225 -0.045 0.744 None
Jo b  Responsibilities 0.010 -0.128 0.215 Full
Job  Security 0.084 -0.047 0.711 Full
C areer Development 0.194 0.008 0.945 None
Hypothesis 5 predicts the relationship between psychological contract breach and 
employee performance (5a), OCB (5b), job satisfaction (5c), and organizational deviance 
(5d) will be mediated by feelings of violation. Feelings o f violation fully mediate the 
relationship between a psychological contract breach of bonuses, job responsibilities, and 
job security and employee performance. Feelings o f violation also partially mediate the
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relationship between a psychological contract breach o f career development and 
employee performance. Because mediation is present in four of the six psychological 
contract breach models, hypothesis 5a is partially supported.
Hypothesis 5b predicts that feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between 
psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship behavior. Feelings of 
violation fully mediate this relationship for job responsibilities and job security, and 
partially mediate this relationship for career development. Hypothesis 5b is partially 
supported, as feelings o f violation did not mediate the relationship between any of the 
transactional psychological contract breaches and organizational citizenship behavior.
Feelings o f violation significantly mediate the relationship between all o f the 
psychological contract breaches and job satisfaction, in support o f hypothesis 5c. 
Feelings o f violation fully mediate the relationship for raises and promotions, while 
feelings o f violation partially mediate the relationship for bonuses, job responsibilities, 
job security, and career development.
Hypothesis 5d predicts a mediating role for feelings of violation in the 
relationship between psychological contract breaches and organizational deviance. 
Feelings o f violation fully mediate the relationship between a breach in job 
responsibilities and job security and organizational deviance. Feelings of violation 
partially mediate the relationship between a psychological contract breach in raises and 
organizational deviance. Hypothesis 5d is partially supported, as feelings o f violation 
serve as a mediator in three of the six psychological contract breach models.
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Hypothesis 6 Results 
Organizational justice was tested as a moderator in the relationship between a 
psychological contract breach and feelings o f violation. To do this, the sample was 
divided into thirds based on the average score on organizational justice scale. The 
bottom third was used as the low justice sample (n=164), and the highest third was used 
as the high justice sample (n-164). The difference in the relationship between 
psychological contract breach and feelings of violation for the high and low justice 
groups was compared using multiple group analysis. Justice has a significant moderating 
effect on this relationship for a breach o f raises, promotions, job security, and career 
development. When justice is high, the relationship between a psychological contract 
breach and feelings o f violation is reduced compared to when justice is low, as expected. 
The strength of the relationship between a psychological contract breach and feelings of 
violation is lower when high justice is present for bonuses and job responsibilities as 
well, though the difference is not significant, shown in Table 28.
Hypothesis 6 is partially supported.
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Table 28
Moderation Results: Difference in Unstandardized Regression Weights o f  Psychological 
Contract Breach to Feelings o f  Violation by Low & High Justice
B re a c h --V io la tio n  
(L o w  J u s t ic e )
B re a c h — V io la tio n  
(H ig h  J u s t ic e )
D iffe re n c e
R a ise 1.029 0.821 0 .208**
B o n u s 0 .8 8 4 0 .8 8 0 0 .0 0 4
P ro m o tio n 1.037 0.781 0 .256***
J o b  R e sp o n s ib ilitie s 0 .8 0 4 0 .9 11 -0 .107
J o b  S e c u r ity 1.016 0 .6 7 8 0 .338***
C a r e e r  D e v e lo p m e n t 0 .9 6 9 0 .718 0 .251**
♦ ♦ ♦ S ig n ific a n t a t p=0 .01  
^ ♦ S ig n if ic an t at p -0 .0 5  
♦ S ig n ific an t at p = 0 .1 0
ANOVA
The participants were asked to which employment status group they belonged: 
Voluntary Stayers/Group 1 (282 participants), Involuntary Stayers/Group 2 (84), 
Voluntary Leavers/Group 3 (79), and Involuntary Leavers/Group 4 (48). Hypothesis 7 
states that those who have stayed with the company involuntary or left voluntarily have 
experienced more psychological contract breaches (H7a), more severe psychological 
contract breaches (H7b), and stronger feelings o f violation (H7c) those who have stayed 
voluntarily or left involuntarily.
For H7a, frequency is calculated as the number o f psychological contract breach 
averages that are 3.5 or over, similar to Hypothesis 1. However, for Hypothesis 7, the 
highest possible score for the total number o f psychological contract breaches is six, 
versus three in Hypothesis 1. For H7b, the severity o f psychological contract breaches is 
calculated as the average breach score from the 5-point Likert-type scale, resulting in a
I l l
range from one to five. For H7c, the severity o f feelings o f violation is tested using only 
the respondents who experienced at least one transactional and one relational 
psychological contract breach like H2. The feelings o f violation scores associated with 
the breaches actually experienced were used to calculate the severity o f feelings of 
violation. The range for severity o f feelings o f violation is one to 5, since the feelings of 
violation were scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale.
To test Hypothesis 7, three, one-way ANOVAs are conducted. The assumptions 
of concern are normality and homogeneity of variance. The Kolmogorov-Smimov test of 
normality indicates that normality is significantly violated in all groups for the frequency 
o f psychological contract breaches. However, the central limit theorem states that the 
sampling distribution tends to be normal in samples o f 30 or more, regardless of the 
shape o f the collected data (Field, 2009), and all employment status groups have at least 
48 observations. Also, theory indicates that the frequency of psychological contract 
breaches should be much lower for Voluntary Stayers. As such, many responses are on 
the low end, violating a normal distribution. Because the normality is in line with the 
theory, these results for normality are not expected to alter interpretation o f ANOVA 
results.
Normality is also significantly violated for the severity o f psychological contract 
breaches, but only for Voluntary Stayers/Group 1. Again, this follows the theory that this 
group should experience less severe psychological contract breaches and feelings of 
violation. Additionally, the group o f Voluntary Stayers is the largest, well above the 
point at which a sample is considered large enough to assume the sampling distribution is 
normal (Field, 2009). Normality was not violated for the severity o f feelings o f feelings
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for any o f the employment status groups. For these reasons, all ANOVA results are 
interpreted as usual.
Levene’s test o f homogeneity o f variance indicates that the frequency of 
psychological contract breaches and the severity o f psychological contract breaches for 
all groups are significantly violated at p<0.05. Homogeneity of variance is not violated 
for the severity o f feelings of violation. Post-hoc tests that do not assume equal variances 
are used to test for differences between groups. Specifically, the Games-Howell post hoc 
test was used because it was not only designed to be used when there are unequal 
variances, but it is also accurate when the sample sizes are unequal, which is the case for 
the employment status groups (Field, 2009).
Hypothesis 7 Results 
The ANOVA results in Table 29 suggest that there are significant (p<0.001) 
differences among the employment status groups in the frequency and severity of 
psychological contract breaches, but not the severity of feelings o f violation (p=0.176).
Table 29
ANOVA Results: Means by Employment Group
F re q u e n c y  o f 
B reach  
(0 .00-6.00)
S ev erity  o f 
B rea ch  
(1.00-5.00)
S ev erity  o f 
V io la tion  
(1.00-5.00)
V o lu n ta ry  S ta y e rs 0.70 2.28 3.69
In v o lu n ta ry  S ta y e rs 2.26 3.08 3.91
V o lu n ta ry  L eav ers 1.75 2.85 4.01
In v o lu n ta ry  L eav ers 1.94 2.96 4.03
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The frequency and severity o f psychological contract breaches o f violation for 
Involuntary Stayers/Group 2 are significantly different from the other groups. The rest of 
the differences are not significant.
Hypothesis 7a states that the frequency of psychological contract breaches will be 
higher for Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers. The frequency o f breaches is 
significantly higher for Involuntary Stayers, though the frequency for Voluntary Leavers 
is not significantly different from Voluntary Stayers and Involuntary Leavers. 
Hypothesis 7a is partially supported. The severity o f psychological contract breaches 
was predicted to be higher for Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers in Hypothesis 
7b. The severity is significantly higher for Involuntary Stayers, but not for Voluntary 
Leavers. Hypothesis 7b is partially supported. Hypothesis 7c posits that the severity of 
feelings of violation is higher for Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers. There were 
no significant differences in the severity o f feelings o f violation between the employment 
status groups. Therefore, Hypothesis 7c is not supported.
Supplemental Analysis
Four additional ANOVAs were conducted to explore the differences in the 
dependent variables o f employee performance, OCB, job satisfaction, and organizational 
deviance, by employment status group. Normality and homogeneity o f variance were 
also assessed for the supplementary tests. Normality and homogeneity o f variance o f the 
employment status groups by dependent variable were very similar to the results for 
Hypothesis 7. Normality is violated, but again, the smallest group has 48 participants, 
which is considered a sufficiently large sample to assume a normal distribution according 
to the central limit theorem (Field, 2009). The assumption of homogeneity o f variance is
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also violated, so the Games-Howell post hoc test for differences was used since it works 
for samples with unequal variance and for unequal group sizes (Field, 2009).
The ANOVAs revealed that there are significant differences among the 
employment status groups (Voluntary Stayers, Involuntary Stayers, Voluntary Leavers, 
and Involuntary Leavers) for organizational citizenship behavior (p=0.000) and job 
satisfaction (p=0.000), but not for employee performance or organizational deviance. 
The results for OCB and job satisfaction can be seen in Table 30. Organizational 
citizenship behavior was measured on a scale o f one to seven, and job satisfaction was 
measured on a scale o f zero to three. Voluntary Stayers have significantly higher OCB 
and job satisfaction than Involuntary Stayers, Voluntary Leavers, and Involuntary 
Leavers. While it is interesting to note that employees who left the company had 
significantly lower organizational citizenship behavior and job satisfaction, the results for 
Involuntary Stayers should be o f great interest to those in industry. These are the 
employees that are still with the organization, even though they do not want to be. Their 
low organizational citizenship behaviors and job satisfaction can negatively affect the 
success o f a merger or acquisition.
Table 30
Mean Scores on Organizational Citizenship Behavior and Job Satisfaction Scales by 
Employment Group Status
O CB Job Satisfaction
Voluntary Stayers 5.200 2.362
Involuntary Stayers 4.252 0.950
Voluntary Leavers 4.217 1.390




The results show that during mergers and acquisitions, more transactional 
psychological contract breaches are perceived by employees than relational psychological 
contract breaches, as expected. Contrary to the hypothesis based on a theory proposed by 
Morrison and Robinson (1997), the severity o f feelings o f violation from relational 
psychological contract breaches was not worse than the severity feelings o f violation of 
transactional psychological contract breaches. Although the feelings o f violation from 
relational psychological contract breaches are less severe, they play more o f a mediating 
role in the severity of the outcomes (employee performance, organizational citizenship 
behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance). In summary, participants 
perceived transactional breaches more often and more severely than relational breaches.
Breaches o f both transactional and relational psychological contracts lead to 
feelings o f violation, which then affect employee performance, organizational citizenship 
behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational deviance. Feelings o f violation mediate the 
relationship between the psychological contract breaches o f bonuses, job responsibilities, 
job security, and career development and employee performance. Feelings o f violation 
also mediate the relationship between the breaches o f job responsibilities, job security, 
and career development, and organizational citizenship behavior. The relationship
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between psychological contract breaches of raises, bonuses, promotions, job 
responsibilities, job security, and career development and job satisfaction is mediated by 
feelings o f violation. Similarly, feelings o f violation also mediate the relationship 
between the breaches o f raises, job responsibilities, and job security and organizational 
deviance. Feelings o f violation do play a role in how severe the effects o f psychological 
contract breaches are on employee performance, organizational citizenship behavior, job 
satisfaction, and organizational deviance. Organizational justice was shown to reduce the 
feelings o f violation associated with a psychological contract breach o f raises, 
promotions, job security, and career development. However, organizational justice did 
not significantly mitigate the feelings o f violation from a breach o f bonuses or job 
responsibilities.
Employees who stayed with the organization involuntarily and those who left the 
organization voluntarily, perceived psychological contract breaches more frequently and 
more severely than those who remained with the organization voluntarily. The 
Involuntary Stayers and Voluntary Leavers also experienced more severe feelings of 
violation than Voluntary Stayers. Involuntary Leavers did not experience significantly 
less frequent breaches, less severe breaches, or less severe feelings o f violation, as 
expected. Table 31 summarizes the results. Additional analyses show that organizational 
citizenship behavior and job satisfaction are significantly higher for Voluntary Stayers 




H I: M ore tran sa c tio n a l th a n  re la tio n a l b reaches 
T ab le  10
Supported
H2: M ore  severe feelings o f  v io lation  from  re la tio n a l th a n  tran sa c tio n a l b reaches
N ot Supported








H 4a: N egative re la tio n sh ip  betw een feelings o f  v io lation  an d  p erfo rm an ce  (T ab le  20)
Raise (Transactional) N ot Supported
Bonus (Transactional) Supported
Promotion (Transactional) N ot Supported
Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Development (Relational) Supported
H 4b: N egative re la tionsh ip  betw een feelings o f  violation  an d  O C B  ( 
T ab le  2 1 )
Raise (Transactional) Supported
Bonus (Transactional) N ot Supported
Promotion (Transactional) Supported
Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Development (Relational) Supported
H4c: N egative re la tionsh ip  betw een feelings o f  v io lation  an d  jo b  sa tisfac tion  ( 




Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Development (Relational) Supported





Promotion (Transactional) Not Supported
Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Developm ent (Relational) Not Supported
H 5a: Feelings o f  vio lation  m ediates re la tionsh ip  betw een b reach  an d  p erfo rm an ce  (T ab le  24)
Raise (Transactional) Not Supported
Bonus (Transactional) Supported
Promotion (Transactional) Not Supported
Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Developm ent (Relational) Supported
H5b: Feelings o f  vio lation m ediates re la tionsh ip  betw een b reach  an d  O C B  (T ab le  25)
Raise (Transactional) Not Supported
Bonus (Transactional) N ot Supported
Promotion (Transactional) Not Supported
Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Developm ent (Relational) Supported




Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Development (Relational) Supported
H 5d: Feelings o f  vio lation  m ediates re la tionsh ip  betw een b reach  an d  deviance (T ab le  27)
Raise (Transactional) Supported
Bonus (Transactional) N ot Supported
Promotion (Transactional) Not Supported
Job Responsibilities (Relational) Supported
Job Security (Relational) Supported
Career Development (Relational) N ot Supported
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Table 31 (Continued)
H6: Ju s tice  m odera tes re la tionsh ip  betw een b reach  an d  feelings o f  vio lation  (T ab le  28)
Raise Supported
Bonus N ot Supported
Promotion Supported
Job Responsibilities N ot Supported
Job Security Supported
Career Development Supported
H 7a: M ore b reaches fo r  V L an d  IS th a n  IL  an d  VS (T ab le  29)
Partially Supported
H 7b: M ore severe b reaches fo r V L an d  IS th a n  IL  an d  VS (T ab le  29)
Partially Supported
H7c: M ore  severe vio lation  fo r VL an d  IS th a n  IL  an d  VS (T ab le  29)
Not Supported
Implications of the Findings
The findings suggest that employees perceive breaches in the psychological 
contract pertaining to raises, bonuses, and promotions more frequently than job 
responsibilities, job security, and career development. Not only do the employees 
perceive these breaches more often, but the feelings o f violation are more severe. The 
results suggest that these elements matter more to employees. This information is useful 
to organizations going through a merger or acquisition. While change is inevitable 
during M&As, employers should make it a higher priority to honor the transactional 
elements o f the employees’ jobs, versus the more relational aspects o f the job.
Psychological contract breaches lead to feelings o f violation, which then leads to 
reduced employee performance, organizational citizenship behaviors, job satisfaction, 
and increased organizational deviance. Feelings o f violation from a psychological
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contract breach o f pay raises significantly effects, in descending order, organizational 
deviance, job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviors, then employee 
performance. A summary of the SEM results can be seen in Table 32.
Table 32
Summary o f  Standardized Regression Weights by Psychological Contract Breach
Raise Bonus Promotion JobResponsibilities Job  Security
Career
Development
Violation-Performancc -0.204 -0.185* -0.210 -0.429*** -0.322*** -0.465*“
Violation-OCB -0.200“ -0.116 -0.228* -0.339*“ -0.216* 41.225**
Violation-Satisfaction -0.497*“ -0.364*** -0.343*** -0.388*** -0.358*** -0 22S**
Violation-Deviance 0.570“ * 0.199“ 0.209 0.326*** 0.218* 0.164
‘ “ Significant at p=0.01 
‘ ‘ Significant at p-0.05 
‘ Significant at p=0.10
A formal test was conducted to determine if these size effects are significantly 
different from each other, and the results from the size effect tests can be seen in Table 
33.
For raises, feelings o f violation most affect organizational deviance (0.570), 
followed by job satisfaction (-0.497), organizational citizenship behavior (0.290), and 
employee performance (-0.204). The results in Table 34 show that even though the effect 
o f feelings o f violation on organizational citizenship behavior (-0.290) is larger than the 
effect on employee performance (-0.024), this difference is not significant. However, all 
other size differences are significant for raises.
The results vary among the different psychological contract breaches. For 
example, feelings of violation from a breach in the psychological contract pertaining to 
job responsibilities has significant effects, in descending order, on employee performance 
(-0.429), job satisfaction (-0.388), organizational citizenship behavior (-0.339), then
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organizational deviance (0.326). As seen in Table 33, the difference between employee 
performance, job satisfaction, and OCB are not significantly different from each other. 
However, the effects o f organizational deviance are significantly different (lower) than 
employee performance, job satisfaction, and OCB. It is important to remember that all of 
the effects from feelings o f violation associated with a psychological contract breach in 
job responsibilities are statistically significant, but they are not significantly different 
from each other. Models for raises and job responsibilities can be seen in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. The results for the other psychological contract breaches can be seen in Table 
33.
The size effects are unique to each psychological contract breach, which provides 
evidence that each psychological contract breach should be considered separately and 
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Table 33
Size Effects: Differences in Standardized Regression Weights within Each Psychological 
Contract Breach Model







-0.069 0.019 -0.090 -0.106 -0.240**
Pcrformancc-
Satisfaction
0.292** 0.179 0.134 -0,040 0.036 -0.240
Pcrformancc-
Deviance
-0.775** -0.384* -0.41 X -0.755** -0.540** -0.629**
OCB-
Satisfaction 0.207** 0.249*** 0.115 0.050 0.142* 0.000
OC’B-Dcviancc -0.X60** -0.315 -0.437* -0.665** -0.434* -0.3X9
Satisfaction-
Deviance
1.067** -0.563*** -0.552* -0.714** -0.576*** -0.3X9*
’ ’ ’ Significant at p=0.01 
’ ♦Significant at p-0.05 
’ Significant at p = 0 .10
The mediating role of feelings o f violation suggests that performance, OCBs, job 
satisfaction, and deviance are impacted more by employees who experience stronger 
feelings of violation. Feelings o f violation mediate the relationship between relational 
psychological contract breaches more often than transactional psychological contract 
breaches. This is unsurprising since employees are likely to be more emotionally 
invested in relational psychological contracts, while transactional psychological contracts
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are more objective. The moderating role o f organizational justice suggests that 
companies that want to reduce the effects o f feelings o f violation experienced by their 
employees should attempt to make the outcome o f decisions, the decision-making process 
itself, and the communication o f such decisions to be perceived as fairly as possible by 
employees.
The results also reveal that employees who remain with the organization 
voluntarily perceive psychological contract breaches less frequently and less severely. 
They also experience weaker feelings o f violation than employees who stay with the 
organization involuntary or who leave the company, whether the decision is voluntary of 
involuntary. While companies may not be as concerned about the effects o f employees 
who leave the organization on a merger and acquisition, there are many employees who 
stay with the organization because they feel they have no other choice (about 17% in this 
study). This group of employees should not be ignored, as they are more likely to 
perceive psychological contract breaches and feelings o f violation. Also, additional 
analysis showed that Involuntary Stayers, along with Involuntary and Voluntary Leavers, 
report significantly lower organizational citizenship behavior and job satisfaction. This 
should be o f great interest to companies since these employees are in a position to 
negatively affect the company during a merger or acquisition.
Limitations of the Research
Since anyone over 18 can sign up for Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, it was 
necessary to use several techniques to ensure quality data. Each respondent was required 
to have a 97% accuracy rating, meaning that they have successfully completed 97% of
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the Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) attempted. They were also required to have 
completed at least 50 HITs and have a registered address in the United States.
A possible concern o f self-reported data is social desirability bias. Social 
desirability is “a need for social approval and acceptance and the belief that this can be 
attained by means o f culturally acceptable and appropriate behaviors” (Marlowe and 
Crowne 1964, 109). If a respondent in this study made themselves appear more socially 
desirable, it would bias the data against the hypotheses. Therefore, based on the results, 
social desirability should not be a concern in the present study.
A limitation o f this study is the low discriminant validity between psychological 
contract breach and feelings of violation. When these two constructs are combined into 
one construct, the fit is reduced. While better discriminant validity would be ideal, the 
best choice for this study is to leave them as separate constructs.
Contributions of the Research
This study adds to the limited research in accounting on psychological contracts, 
despite their prominence in the workplace. Smith (1993), Martin (1995), Schofield 
(1996), Mac Rory (1999), Bruce (2001), and Classe (2004) urge practitioners to realize 
the importance o f employees’ psychological contracts. Bruce (2001) and Classe (2004) 
comment on the significance o f psychological contracts during mergers and acquisitions. 
This study empirically tests the comments made by Bruce (2001) and Classe (2004). 
This study also adds to prior research by including feelings of violation as a mediator, 
which has not been done in a merger and acquisition setting. Also, organizational justice 
is used as a moderator in the relationship between psychological contract breaches and
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feelings o f violation, which is another new application in the merger and acquisition 
setting.
Contrary to prior studies that used samples from one or a few companies that 
experienced mergers and acquisitions, this study utilizes an online survey. This is 
advantageous as it allows for respondents from a wide variety o f companies and 
industries to be included in the sample, increasing external validity. Information about 
employees who remain with the organization because they feel they have no other choice 
is o f importance to employers since they are in a position to negatively affect the 
company. An online survey offers more anonymity for Involuntary Stayers to provide 
honest responses than previous studies that use face-to-face interviews or surveys 
associated with a particular employer. This data collection method also allows for 
employees who are no longer with the organization to be included in the sample.
Suggestions for Future Research
Downsizing is often a major part of mergers and acquisitions. However, many 
companies experience downsizing separately from a merger or acquisition. The 
organizational changes involved in both situations are similar, but the reactions from 
employees may differ. Future research can examine the similarities and differences in 
psychological contract breaches and outcomes between companies who have merged or 
been acquired and companies who have downsized.
In this research, the participants indicate their employment status from staying or 
leaving, voluntarily or involuntarily. An extension o f the current study is to investigate 
the differences in effects on employee performance, organizational citizenship behavior, 
job satisfaction, and organizational deviance for voluntary and involuntary stayers and
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leavers. Further research can include other considerations o f employment status, such as 
how attached employees are to their job. Another consideration is why employees 
choose to leave their job and what pressures they may face to leave the organization.
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B reach-R aise 2.60 1.04 1.00-5.00 1.00 5.00
Breach-B onus 2.62 1.00 1 00-5.00 1.00 5.00
B reach- Prom otion 2.68 1.00 1.00-5.00 1.00 5.00
B reach-Job  R esponsibilities 2.44 0.95 1.00-5.00 1.00 5 00
B reach-Job  S ecurity 2.41 1.05 1.00-5.00 1.00 5 00
B reach -C areer Developm ent 2.68 0.99 1 00-5.00 1 00 5.00
V iolation-R aise 2.41 112 1 00-5.00 1 00 5.00
V iolation-Bonus 2.47 1.09 1.00-5.00 1.00 5.00
V ioiation-Prom otion 2.44 1.09 1 00-5.00 1 00 5 00
V iolation-Job Responsibilities 2.26 1.04 1 00-5.00 1.00 5 00
V iolation-Job S ecurity 2.24 111 1.00-5.00 1.00 5,00
V iolation-C areer D evelopm ent 2.40 1.08 1.00-5.00 1 00 5 00
P erfo rm ance 4.44 0.58 1.00-5.00 2.17 5.00
O C B 4.79 1.24 1 00-7.00 1.00 7.00
Jo b  Satisfaction 1.84 1.14 000-4.00 0.00 4 00
O rgan izationa l Deviance 2.41 1.17 1.00-7.00 1.00 7.00





Psychological Contract Breach (Robinson and Morrison 2000)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) Almost all o f the promises about [psychological contract breach] made by my 
employer during recruitment have been kept so far. (reverse scored)
2.) I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling the promises about 
[psychological contract breach] made me to when I was hired, (reverse scored)
3.) So far my employer has done an excellent job o f fulfilling their promises about 
[psychological contract breach], (reverse scored)
4.) I have not received everything promised to me about [psychological contract breach] 
in exchange for my contributions.
5.) My employer has broken many of its promises to me about [psychological contract 
breach] even though I’ve upheld my side of the deal.
Feelings of Violation (Robinson and Morrison 2000)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) I feel a great deal of anger toward my organization over [psychological contract 
breach],
2.) I feel betrayed by my organization with regard to [psychological contract breach],
3.) I feel that my organization has violated the contract about [psychological contract 
breach] between us.
4.) I feel extremely frustrated by how I have been treated by my organization relating to 
[psychological contract breach].
Employee Performance (Williams and Anderson 1991)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree,
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) I adequately complete all of my assigned duties.
2.) I fulfill all the responsibilities specified in my job description.
3.) I perform the tasks that are expected of me.
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4.) I meet the formal performance requirements o f my job.
5.) I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance evaluation, (dropped)
6.) I neglect aspects o f the job that I am obligated to perform, (reverse scored)
7.) I fail to perform essential duties of my job. (reverse scored)
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (Lee and Allen 2002)
7-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly Disagree, 4=Neither Agree 
nor Disagree, 5=Slightly Agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly Agree)
1.) I attend functions that are not required but that help the organizational image.
2.) I keep up with developments in this organization.
3.) I defend the organization when other employees criticize it.
4.) I show pride when representing the organization in public.
5.) I offer ideas to improve the functioning of the organization.
6.) I express loyalty toward the organization.
7.) I take action to protect the organization from potential problems.
8.) I demonstrate concern about the image o f the organization
Job Satisfaction (Russell et al. 2004)
3-point scale (0=No, 1=?, 3=Yes)
Indicate whether the following adjectives and short phrases describe(d) your job during 
the merger or acquisition.
1.) Good
2.) Undesirable (reverse scored)
3.) Better than most
4.) Disagreeable (reverse scored)




8.) Poor (reverse scored)
Organizational Deviance (Bennett and Robinson 2000)
7-point scale (l=Never, 2=Once a year, 3=Twice a year, 4=Several times a year, 
5=Monthly, 6=Weekly, 7=Daily)
Indicate how often you did/do the following activities during the merger or acquisition.
1.) Taken property from  work without permission, (dropped)
2.) Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead o f working.
3.) Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed fo r  more money than you spent on business 
expenses, (dropped)
4.) Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.
5.) Come in late to work without permission.
6.) Littered your work environment, (dropped)
7.) Neglected to follow your boss’s instructions.
8.) Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked.
9.) Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person.
(dropped)
10.) Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job. (dropped)
11.) Put little effort into your work.
12.) Dragged out work in order to get overtime.
Organizational Justice (Ambrose and Schminke 2009)
5-point scale (l=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 
4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)
1.) Overall, I’m treated fairly by my organization.
2.) Usually, the way things work in this organization are not fair, (reverse scored)
3.) In general, I can count on my organization to be fair.
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4.) In general, the treatment I receive around here is fair.
5.) For the most part, this organization treats its employees fairly.
6.) Most o f the people who work here would say they are often treated unfairly, 
(reverse scored)
APPENDIX C 
MEASUREMENT SCALE ITEM CORRELATIONS
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Psychological Contract Breach Item Correlations
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